SHORT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

4/12/2012 1:56 AM

THE POLITICAL TURN IN AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
POWER, RATIONALITY, AND REASONS
JODI L. SHORT†
ABSTRACT
Reason giving is central to U.S. administrative law and practice.
Traditionally, courts and scholars alike have located both the
constraining and the legitimating force of reasons in the constraining
and legitimating force of Reason, or rationality, but several recent
developments signal a political turn in understandings of
administrative justification. First, in upholding the decision of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to penalize
broadcasters for televising “fleeting expletives” in the Fox Television
case, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled the diminished importance of
reasoned administrative justification and a broadened acceptance of
political justifications for changes in agency policy. Second, motivated
by a gathering movement to reconceptualize the legitimacy of
administrative agencies in terms of their political—and specifically,
their presidential—accountability, prominent administrative-law
scholars advocate approaches to arbitrary-and-capricious review that
would encourage or require agencies to articulate explicitly the
political reasons for their actions.
This Article takes seriously the challenges to the rationalist reasongiving paradigm posed by political reason-giving models, but it
categorically rejects their urge to renovate administrative law’s
fundamental commitment to reasoned justification. Instead, it
develops a new theoretical framework that sees reasoned justification
as a constraint embodied not in doctrine or politics, but in the way
that law and political control structure the organizational
characteristics and social interactions of agencies. Drawing on this
framework, the Article critiques models of political reason giving for
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undermining the social and organizational structures that shape and
constrain what agencies do and for failing to offer a coherent
alternative theory of administrative reason giving. The Article
concludes by arguing more broadly that reform projects must
consider the institutional dimensions of agency constraint and think
more deeply about what kinds of agencies they would create.
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INTRODUCTION
Reason giving is central to U.S. administrative law and practice.
Courts and legislatures require agencies to support their actions with
reasons, and administrative-law scholars theorize the practice of
reason giving as central to constraining and legitimating
administrative agencies. Traditionally, courts and scholars alike have
located both the constraining and legitimating force of reasons in the
constraining and legitimating force of Reason, or rationality, but
several developments signal a shift in this understanding.
First, in upholding the decision of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to penalize broadcasters for televising “fleeting
1
expletives” in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the U.S. Supreme
Court engaged in its most sustained discussion of agency reason
giving since Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v.
2
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. Justice Scalia’s analysis
in Fox signaled the diminished importance of reasoned
decisionmaking and a broadened acceptance of political justifications
3
for changes in agency policy. Second, scholars have shown renewed
interest in agency reason giving, with prominent administrative-law
scholars advocating approaches to arbitrary-and-capricious review
that would encourage or require agencies to articulate explicitly the
4
political reasons for their actions. Among both Supreme Court
Justices and legal commentators, the pendulum appears to be
swinging from an understanding of reasons as rationality to an
understanding of reasons as politics.

1. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009).
2. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
3. See infra Part II.A. But see Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011) (confirming
the ongoing importance of reasoned administrative decisionmaking). Although Judulang v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011), might be read to cabin the more radical implications of Fox, the
Fox decision nonetheless suggests the conditions under which some members of the Court
might be willing to accept political justifications as reasonable, and it has motivated an
independent body of scholarship pressing for the broader acceptance of political reason giving.
See infra Part II.B.
4. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making,
108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2010) (“We should require that a significant agency rule include
at least a summary of the substance of executive supervision.”); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a
Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2009) (“[W]hat count
as ‘valid’ reasons under arbitrary and capricious review should be expanded to include certain
political influences . . . , so long as the political influences are openly and transparently disclosed
in the agency’s rulemaking record.”).
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This political turn in the doctrine governing agency reason giving
is closely connected with a gathering movement to reconceptualize
the legitimacy of administrative agencies in terms of their political—
and specifically, their presidential—accountability as opposed to their
5
6
expertise, their fidelity to statutory commands, or their role as fora
7
for robust citizen participation and deliberation. Then-Professor
Elena Kagan makes the signal case for “presidential administration”
as the reigning model of agency legitimacy, arguing that presidential
control over administrative agencies promotes their accountability
8
and their efficacy, two touchstones of legitimate governance. Despite
the fact that multiple nonpresidential models of agency legitimacy
continue to inform administrative practice, doctrine, and theory,
9
10
recent scholarship has proclaimed —or has simply assumed —the
supremacy of the presidential model of administration and has set
about the task of overhauling administrative-law doctrine to comport
with this understanding.

5. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (advocating
expertise as the core justification for the New Deal administrative state); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (chronicling
various justifications for the administrative state, including expertise).
6. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 1676 (referring to strict fidelity to statutory commands as
the “transmission belt” model of administrative law).
7. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992) (“[G]overnment’s primary responsibility is to enable the
citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and to reach a consensus on the common
good.”); Stewart, supra note 5, at 1679 (noting that rigorous enforcement of procedural
requirements, such as hearings, may enhance agency legitimacy by affording broader citizen
access to agencies).
8. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–46 (2001).
9. See Watts, supra note 4, at 38–39 (“[O]ne major advantage of rethinking hard look
review . . . is that hard look could be better harmonized with administrative law’s current
embrace of political decisionmaking.”). Professor Kathryn Watts suggests that political-control
models have not merely supplemented, but have supplanted, expertise-based models of
administration. Id. She argues that they have “widespread acceptance” among scholars, id. at 35,
and that they drive key doctrinal areas of administrative law, most notably the doctrinal
framework created by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984), Watts, supra note 4. at 13, 84. She does not discuss the erosion of Chevron’s force
and coherence in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), and United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), and its ongoing contestation—or, in the view of some, its “ongoing
obfuscation”—in more recent cases such as Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,
131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). Id. at 1340 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). These doctrinal developments are
difficult to square with a strong version of the presidential-control model.
10. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1130 (asserting that whereas presidential
administration is assumed to play a positive role in agency action, “presidential . . . influence on
an agency decision is not clearly good or bad”).
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11

The Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s) arbitrary-and12
capricious standard has been identified as an important area for
renovation. Under prevailing understandings of the arbitrary-andcapricious standard, a court’s role in reviewing agency exercises of
policymaking discretion is to ensure “that agencies have engaged in
13
reasoned decisionmaking.” To make this assessment, courts have
required “that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its
14
action,” establishing a “rational connection between the facts found
15
and the choice made.” Traditionally, valid reasons establishing this
connection have taken the form of empirical evidence, policy
arguments, agency expertise, or logical arguments based on statutory
language or the purpose of the broader statutory scheme
16
administered by the agency. Political reason-giving models would
expand the universe of valid reasons for agency action to include a
claim by the agency that it followed a presidential directive that was
17
itself supported by good reasons. This shift in the object of judicial
review—from demanding rational reasons and evidence developed by
an agency to inquiring into conformance with well-supported
presidential directives—has the potential to alter fundamentally not
only the nature of arbitrary-and-capricious review but also the way
agencies structure their decisionmaking processes and conceptualize
their policymaking role.
This Article resists the drive to renovate administrative law’s
fundamental commitment to reasoned justification and seeks more
broadly to force a searching and skeptical consideration of doctrinal
reform motivated by the intellectual vogue for presidentialism. The
11. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
12. See id. § 10(e)(B)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”).
13. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483–84 (2011).
14. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009).
15. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
16. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 82 (2008).
17. For a more detailed description and analysis of how political reasons have been defined
by their proponents and for examples of what counts as a valid political reason under the
proposed models, see infra Part II.B. In addition, Professor Watts would also accept certain
kinds of congressional influence as valid justification for agency action. See Watts, supra note 4,
at 63 (“[C]ongressional influences could serve as yet another possible source of political
influence that—if openly disclosed—could help to adequately explain an agency’s rulemaking
decision for purposes of arbitrary and capricious review.”).
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Article has two immediate aims. First, it provides a deep critique of
political reason-giving proposals, not through a point-by-point
18
rebuttal as others have ably done, but rather by exposing the
inconsistency of these proposals with any credible theory of
administrative justification. Second, it develops a new theoretical
framework for understanding the mechanisms by which reasoned
justification shapes and constrains administrative agencies. Agencies
are disciplined not solely by the constraints of rationality, legal
doctrine, and political power, but also by the social and institutional
19
environments in which they are embedded. Using a novel
application of sociological theory to deference doctrine, this theory of
administrative justification demonstrates how reason giving shapes
agencies through their organizational structures and their social
interactions with the other branches of government. The sociological
theory of reason giving further highlights the real danger of political
reason giving: it is likely to erode the social mechanisms that shape
agencies as organizations and that discipline their day-to-day
activities.

18. See Enrique Armijo, Politics, Rulemaking, and Judicial Review: A Response to
Professor Watts, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 573, 574–79 (2010) (arguing that political reason giving is
contrary to the goal of the comment process in that it undermines the importance of citizen
participation and evidence-based decisionmaking); Stephen M. Johnson, Disclosing the
President’s Role in Rulemaking: A Critique of the Reform Proposals, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1003,
1033 (2011) (arguing that courts might have difficulty discerning what weight to give to political
factors and that this difficulty might lead to more uncertainty in judicial review); Glen
Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 849, 893–97 (2012) (arguing that political reason giving may undermine deliberative
democracy).
19. See, e.g., DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at
5 (2001) (arguing that an agency’s autonomy and influence are dependent on the network of
interests in which it is embedded); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private
Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 383–84
(2006) (exploring how the delegation of regulatory interpretation to regulated private firms
shapes agency accountability); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 426 (2009) (discussing the
interrelationship between separation-of-powers doctrine and institutional constraints on the
executive branch); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1675–91 (2006)
(describing how the structure of the intelligence bureaucracy shapes the nature and efficacy of
administrative national-security policies); see also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing” the
Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 587, 591 (2009) (demonstrating how the organizational structure of the Federal Security
Agency enhanced presidential control).
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Beyond the immediate debate about political reason giving, this
theoretical framework provides a new way of thinking about
administrative-law reform more generally. If the constraints of
administrative law are ultimately enacted at the micro- and mesolevels through organizational structures and social interactions, then
administrative-law doctrine must attend to its impact on these crucial
structures and processes. It is important to understand how different
rules might support or undermine the mechanisms that so deeply
influence what agencies do. Administrative-law scholarship should
think not only about the formal coherence of doctrine but also about
what kinds of agencies different doctrinal frameworks might create.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the doctrinal
framework for administrative reason giving and the rationalist
theories of reason giving that have developed to explain and justify it.
Part II identifies the political turn in administrative reason giving that
court decisions and scholarship have taken, revising conventional
rationalist accounts of what should count as a valid reason to
encompass certain political justifications for administrative action.
Part III explores possible theoretical bases for political reason giving,
including presidential-control theory and information-disclosure
theory, and concludes that neither supports the practice. Part IV
draws on sociological accounts of reason giving to develop a new
theory of administrative justification that sees its constraints
embodied not solely in doctrine or politics, but also in the way that
those forces structure the organizational characteristics and social
interactions of agencies. I conclude by drawing out the implications of
this analysis more generally, suggesting that administrative-law
reform should attend to how doctrine might influence the social and
organizational structures that shape agencies. A viable doctrinal
framework must be defensible in these terms.
I. THE PREVAILING ACCOUNT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REASON GIVING
A. Arbitrary-and-Capricious Review Doctrine
Administrative-law doctrine places reason giving at the center of
agency policymaking and judicial review. The APA explicitly requires

SHORT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1818

4/12/2012 1:56 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1811
20

agencies to provide reasons for certain decisions, and courts have
demanded that agencies supply reasons more broadly as an essential
21
basis for judicial review. Since 1943, in SEC v. Chenery Corp., the
Court has made clear that agency actions will stand or fall based on
the reasons that the agency itself provides, even if other reasons could
22
be found to support those actions. In Citizens To Preserve Overton
23
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Court adapted this generalized reason-giving
requirement to arbitrary-and-capricious review under the APA,
demanding that agencies “disclose the factors that were considered”
as well as the agency’s “construction of the evidence” in order to
24
facilitate judicial review. Agencies responded by supplying reasons
to justify their policy actions, and courts have long viewed their role
as ensuring that those reasons establish a “rational connection
25
between the facts found and the choice[s] made” by the agencies.
Since 1983, State Farm has supplied the standard for assessing the
adequacy of an agency’s reasons for its decisions. Although State
Farm stressed the “narrow” scope of judicial review under the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard and cautioned that a “court is not
26
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,” it also commanded
reviewing courts to “consider whether [a] decision [had been] based
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there ha[d]
27
been a clear error of judgment.” State Farm articulated several
28
factors that are “relevant” to the question of an administrative
decision’s validity, including (1) whether the agency relied on factors
29
that Congress had not intended it to consider; (2) whether the

20. See Administrative Procedure Act § 8(b), 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) (2006) (“All [agency]
decisions [with respect to procedures requiring a hearing] . . . shall include a statement
of . . . findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor . . . .”).
21. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
22. See, e.g., id. at 89 (holding that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s action “must
be judged by the standards which the Commission itself invoked,” even if other reasons might
have supported it).
23. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
24. Id. at 420.
25. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285
(1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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agency looked at all important aspects of the problem, including
30
viable policy alternatives; (3) whether the agency’s explanation for
31
its decision was consistent with the evidence before it; and
(4) whether the agency’s view was “so implausible” that it could not
be considered a mere policy judgment or product of agency
32
expertise.
33
State Farm’s version of hard-look review not only made reason
giving central to administrative policymaking but also made clear
what kinds of reasons will suffice. Specifically, it endorsed what
Professors Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy describe as the
34
“rationalist” model of reason giving. In contrast with earlier, highly
deferential standards of review that upheld agency action “as long as
35
it was ‘conceivably’ supported by the facts in the record,” the
rationalist approach represents a more searching model that places
the onus on the agency (1) to document reasons for its decisions; (2)
to compile evidence supporting those reasons; (3) to consider,
30. Id. at 43, 51.
31. Id. at 43.
32. Id.
33. Hard-look review is a doctrinal framework that developed in the D.C. Circuit during
the 1970s and that was generally perceived as increasing the stringency with which courts
reviewed agency decisions. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency
Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 406. Some have characterized it as requiring courts to take a
hard look at the substance of an agency’s decision and the process through which that decision
was adopted; others have characterized it as requiring courts to ensure that the agency itself
took a hard look at the issues. See generally id. at 419–22 (describing the “‘hard look’ review”
standard). There is some controversy over which version the Court adopted and whether the
Court’s version is as stringent as the D.C. Circuit’s. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“The Commission’s
action in cutting off consideration of waste disposal and reprocessing issues in licensing
proceedings based on the cursory development of the facts which occurred in this proceeding
was capricious and arbitrary.”), rev’d sub nom. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 55, 66–67 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (affording “careful and exhaustive” consideration to proposed Environmental Protection
Agency regulations); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(remanding for further proceedings an agency’s decision to deny a suspension of the
requirements of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857–1857l (1970), with respect to a truck
manufacturer). And some commentators argue that State Farm should not be read to have
adopted hard-look review at all. E.g., Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 452–57 (2009). I do not address these debates here, but I
note that it is conventional in the literature to refer to the State Farm standard as hard-look
review. E.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1749, 1777–78 (2007).
34. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 33, at 411.
35. Id. at 410 (quoting Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 182 (1935)).
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analyze, and reject contrary evidence; and (4) to consider, analyze,
and reject important alternatives to its preferred policy based on the
36
available evidence. Although many have charged that the intensive
justificatory practices that developed in response to the doctrinal
demands of hard-look review are an onerous drag on agency
37
policymaking, a substantial literature has developed to explain and
justify hard-look review’s reason-giving requirement. The next
Section examines the theoretical bases for rationalist reason giving by
administrative agencies.
B. Rationalist Theories of Reason Giving
The legal literature has developed an extensive account of the
work reasons do in the administrative context. According to this
literature, the rationalist reason-giving requirement provides external
checks on agency power, constrains internal decisionmaking
processes, demonstrates respect for governed subjects, and enhances
the legitimacy of agency decisions by rationalizing them. I summarize
each argument in this Section.
First, reason giving facilitates external checks on the exercise of
agency power. Reasons provide two interrelated mechanisms for
38
“policing official behavior” : first, they promote political
accountability, and second, they enable judicial review. Reason giving

36. Cf. id. at 423–24 (summarizing the “substantive content” that the Court introduced into
arbitrary-and-capricious review in State Farm).
37. E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 49 (1993); CARNEGIE COMM’N ON SCI., TECH. & GOV’T, RISK AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 107 (1993); JERRY L. MASHAW
& DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 199, 224–55 (1990); Jerry L. Mashaw
& David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J.
ON REG. 257, 262 (1987); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking:
A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 532–36 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity,
Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419, 1444 (1992)
[hereinafter McGarity, Some Thoughts]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and Regulatory
Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 81, 83 (1996); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency
Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 72 (1997)
[hereinafter Pierce, Judicial Review of Agency Actions]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995) [hereinafter Pierce, Seven
Ways]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the
District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 37 DUKE L.J. 300,
301 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules:
How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7,
8 (1991).
38. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States,
and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 103 (2007).
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promotes political accountability by making the administrative
decisionmaking process more transparent and thus more accessible to
citizens and more amenable to congressional oversight. As one
commentator puts it, “The reason-giving administrator is . . . more
39
subject to general public surveillance.” Moreover, citizens who can
survey administrative processes are more empowered to participate in
40
those processes so as “to evaluate, discuss, and criticize [agency]
41
action, as well as potentially to seek political or legal reform.”
Reason giving also facilitates congressional oversight and control of
agencies by making them more transparent both to members and to
42
their constituents. Rationalist reasons are therefore a key
mechanism of democratic and political oversight. In addition, reasons
43
are a “protector of judicial review.” Reasons render the
administrative process more transparent for judges and, at the same
44
time, create a record that will enable judicial review. Robust judicial
review, in turn, reinforces and makes more credible the exercise of
external control by informed citizens who can sue the agency if it fails
45
to take account of their views.
Second, in addition to facilitating external policing of agency
action, reason giving shapes the internal decisionmaking dynamics of
agencies in ways that tend to cabin administrative discretion. Here as
well, two distinct mechanisms are at work. First, many argue that the
imperative to provide rational reasons has a “decision-disciplining”

39. Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 181.
40. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 529 (2003) (“[T]he [reasoned-decisionmaking]
requirement may promote accountability by ensuring public participation in or oversight of the
administrative process. It may even coincide with political control of the administrative
process.”).
41. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1278
(2009).
42. See Bamberger, supra note 19, at 403 (“[W]ide managerial discretion may . . . obscur[e]
the reasons underlying particular decisions. In this way, broad leeway can imperil the ability of
democratic or constitutional institutions like the public, Congress, and the courts to oversee
agencies and review their decisions.”); Bressman, supra note 33, at 1780 (arguing that reasoned
decisionmaking is “a special form of accountability related to legislative monitoring”).
43. Mashaw, supra note 38, at 111 (emphasis omitted).
44. See Shapiro, supra note 39, at 182 (“[O]nce a judge has a record, anything is possible.”);
see also Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (remanding
the case for lack of a record of the reasons for the agency decision).
45. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in
the Regulatory Process, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 735, 736–37 (1996) (describing how litigation can
be part of an ongoing relationship between interest groups and regulators).
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effect that improves the quality of agency decisionmaking. Professor
Martin Shapiro argues, for instance, that “[a] decisionmaker required
to give reasons will be more likely to weigh pros and cons carefully
before reaching a decision than will a decisionmaker able to proceed
47
by simple fiat.” Such a decisionmaker is also more likely to consider
all of the evidence for and against a given policy. This deliberative
stance toward policy decisionmaking is said to filter out tendencies
toward “bias, self-interest, insufficient reflection, or simply excess
48
haste” on the part of administrators who know that they must justify
their actions in rational terms. Second, reasons are said to exercise a
kind of prospective discipline on an agency by narrowing the choices
it can make in the future and the grounds on which it can make them.
Reasons given to support one decision tend to shape and constrain an
agency’s future decisions through a path-dependent logic. Reasons
commit the reason giver to a certain amount of consistency,
49
“although not inviolably so.” Although reasons articulated in one
case do not strictly bind a decisionmaker in future cases, as a matter
of social practice the reason giver commits herself to deciding some
range of future cases in accordance with the general principles
50
embodied by the reasons given in a prior case. At the very least,
reasons provide interested parties with grounds on which to argue
that prior reasoning should guide future decisions.
Third, reason giving lends a kind of moral force to agency
decisions because the act of giving reasons demonstrates respect for
the governed subject. Reason giving is “a way to bring the subject of
51
the decision into the enterprise.” It “emphasizes the obligation of
public officials and citizens to engage with one another on the
52
substance of policy issues with an attitude of mutual respect.” The
implied alternative is a tyrannical government that imposes its
policies on citizens without respect for their wishes or their
personhood. As Professor Jerry Mashaw cautions, the exercise of
53
“[a]uthority without reason is literally dehumanizing.”

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 657 (1995).
Shapiro, supra note 39, at 180.
Schauer, supra note 46, at 657.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 656–57.
Id. at 658.
Staszewski, supra note 41, at 1286.
Mashaw, supra note 38, at 118.
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Finally, reason giving legitimates the exercise of administrative
power. Civic republicans and others partial to deliberative-democratic
models of agency legitimacy see reasons as a mechanism for
facilitating dialogue toward the end of generating public consensus
54
around policy outcomes. The reasons agencies give for their
decisions provide the basis for citizen deliberation and dialogue with
the government, and this dialogue can shape preferences and
55
promote “broad consensus around a particular solution.” This broad
consensus legitimates agency policy. Even when agencies’ publicregarding rationales fail to achieve consensus, “reasoned consistency”
can supply its own form of legitimacy by demonstrating the objective
56
rationality of a given decision. A dominant view among scholars of
reason giving is that rationality is “the touchstone of legitimacy in the
57
liberal, administrative state,” ultimately eclipsing political and other
58
forms of accountability. According to this view, “the legitimacy of
bureaucratic action resides in its promise to exercise power on the
59
basis of knowledge,” and reasons provide evidence that the agency
has, in fact, done so. As Professor Mashaw writes, “The path of
American administrative law has been the path of the progressive
60
submission of power to reason.”
II. THE POLITICAL TURN IN ADMINISTRATIVE REASON GIVING
If the State Farm majority defined the rationalist reason-giving
paradigm, a partial concurrence in that case contained the seeds of
what I describe as the political turn. On review in State Farm was the
Reagan administration’s rescission of a safety standard issued by
President Carter’s Department of Transportation (DOT) that
required auto manufacturers to install either air bags or automatic

54. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 7, at 1514 (“[G]overnment’s primary responsibility is to
enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and to reach consensus on the
common good.”); Staszewski, supra note 41, at 1280 (“It is not enough for a decision maker to
follow her own or her constituents’ pre-political preferences, but she must instead be capable of
explaining why a particular course of action is best for the community as a whole.”).
55. Staszewski, supra note 41, at 1282.
56. Bressman, supra note 40, at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 25 (2001).
58. See supra note 40.
59. Mashaw, supra note 38, at 117.
60. Mashaw, supra note 57, at 26.
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61

seat belts in new-model cars. Although politics had clearly motivated
62
63
this decision —President Reagan had run on a deregulatory agenda,
presumably supported by the majority of citizens that elected him—
the Justices in the State Farm majority failed to consider the
implications of the president’s electoral mandate for the validity of
this change in policy. Instead, the Court invalidated the DOT’s
rescission on the ground that the agency’s justifications had failed to
64
meet the appropriate standard of “reasoned decisionmaking.”
Specifically, the Court held that the DOT had failed to consider
65
alternatives to a complete rescission and that the agency had failed
adequately to explain evidence before it that was inconsistent with its
66
proffered basis for the decision.
Although the Justices in the partial concurrence authored by
then-Justice Rehnquist agreed that the agency had failed adequately
to justify key aspects of its decision, they also criticized the majority
for ignoring the political context of the agency’s decision:
The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to
the election of a new President of a different political party. It is
readily apparent that the responsible members of one administration
may consider public resistance and uncertainties to be more
important than do their counterparts in a previous administration. A
change in administration brought about by the people casting their
votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s
reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.
As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by
Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate
67
priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.

Long a boundary-pushing hypothetical for professors of
administrative law, this passage now motivates an emerging theory of
political reason giving in administrative law based on Justice
Rehnquist’s intuition that politics should count in courts’ appraisals of

61. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
34–36 (1983).
62. Cf. id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The agency’s
changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new President of a
different political party.”).
63. MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 30 (1985).
64. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51–52 (majority opinion).
65. Id. at 56.
66. Id. at 54.
67. Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
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administrative decisions. The following Sections outline the contours
of the political turn that has emerged in courts’ and commentators’
views of reason giving.
A. The Court’s Political Turn?
In 2009, the Supreme Court engaged in its most extensive
reflection on administrative reason giving since State Farm in a case
filed by Fox Television and other broadcasters against the FCC for
the agency’s repeal of a longstanding “safe harbor” policy protecting
68
isolated utterances of profanity on broadcast television. The Court’s
decision in Fox upheld the FCC’s order declaring actionably indecent
Fox’s broadcast of profane utterances by Hollywood stars as they
accepted and presented awards during live telecasts of the 2002 and
69
2003 Billboard Music Awards. The FCC rested its order on the
statutory “indecency ban,” which prohibits broadcasting of
70
“any . . . indecent . . . language.” Although the ban had been in effect
71
since 1948, it had long been tempered by the FCC’s “safe harbor”
policy, under which the agency had declined to prosecute violations
involving “fleeting expletives,” or isolated utterances of single, vulgar
words used as expletives rather than to refer literally to sexual or
72
excretory activities.
In 2000, the FCC for the first time pursued an enforcement
73
action against a broadcaster for televising a single, fleeting expletive.
It cited NBC for a broadcast of the Golden Globes in which the
singer Bono, upon winning an award, had exclaimed, “This is really,
74
really, fucking brilliant!” The FCC used this enforcement action to
75
announce its changed position on the safe-harbor policy. Then, on

68. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
69. Id. at 1819.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).
71. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1464, 62 Stat. 683, 769 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1464 (2006)).
72. See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1809 (discussing the FCC’s departure from the safe-harbor
policy); Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden
Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4980 (2004) (“While prior Commission and staff
action have indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ such as that here are
not indecent or would not be acted upon, . . . we conclude that any such interpretation is no
longer good law.”).
73. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1807.
74. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4976 n.2.
75. See id. at 4980 (“While prior Commission and staff action have indicated that isolated
or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ such as that here are not indecent or would not be acted
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76

the basis of the Golden Globes order, the FCC cited Fox for similar
77
infractions on its awards shows. Fox challenged the FCC’s 2006
order in part on the ground that the FCC’s change to the safe-harbor
policy had been arbitrary and capricious—specifically, that the
change had not been sufficiently justified by the reasons the agency
78
gave for it.
In its Golden Globes order, the FCC provided four reasons in
support of its rescission of the safe-harbor policy and its new policy of
citing broadcasters for fleeting expletives. First, it argued that the
distinction between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words was
79
incoherent, especially with respect to the “F-word.” Even when the
word had not been used literally, the FCC found it to be “patently
offensive” because, the FCC maintained, it “is one of the most vulgar,
graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English
80
language.” Second, the FCC argued that categorically exempting
fleeting expletives from enforcement would encourage more
81
widespread use of offensive language, albeit one word at a time.
Third, it argued that enforcement action was necessary to “safeguard
82
the well-being of the nation’s children,” who would be forced to
83
suffer the harmful “first blow” of fleeting profanities. Finally, the
FCC noted that advances in technology had made it easier to bleep

upon, consistent with our decision today we conclude that any such interpretation is no longer
good law. . . . We now clarify . . . that the mere fact that specific words or phrases are not
sustained or repeated does not mandate a finding that material that is otherwise patently
offensive to the broadcast medium is not indecent.”).
76. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975 (2004).
77. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8,
2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13,299, 13,329 (2006). At the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, aired live on
Fox, award winner Cher said, “[F]uck ‘em,” in response to her critics. Id. at 13,300. At the 2003
Billboard Music Awards, again aired live on Fox, Nicole Richie said, “Have you ever tried to
get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking simple.” Id.
78. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 446–47 (2d Cir. 2007)
(explaining that Fox was challenging the FCC’s “notices of apparent liability” on, among others,
administrative grounds and holding that the change in policy was arbitrary and capricious
because “the FCC ha[d] failed to articulate a reasoned basis for this change in policy”), rev’d,
129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
79. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4978 (“[W]e believe
that, given the core meaning of the ‘F-word,’ any use of that word or a variation, in any context,
inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls within the first prong of our indecency
definition.”).
80. Id. at 1479.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads., 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,308.
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out offensive language in live broadcasts without compromising the
84
integrity of the program. The FCC provided no evidence supporting
its reasons. Instead, it based them on commonsense intuitions about
the sensibilities of children and the behavioral proclivities of
broadcasters.
The Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s orders on the basis that
the FCC had satisfied the reason-giving requirement as articulated
85
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. In his opinion
supporting this result, Justice Scalia made some provocative
suggestions about the nature of administrative reasons.
First, Justice Scalia’s opinion suggested that reasons need not
necessarily be well reasoned. Justice Scalia acknowledged that aspects
of the FCC’s explanation for its change in the fleeting-expletives
86
policy “may not [have been] entirely convincing.” Nonetheless, his
opinion accepted the agency’s justification on the ground that, at a
minimum, it demonstrated “that the Commission knew it was making
87
a change.” Although Justice Scalia did not address this tension
squarely, his acceptance of minimally persuasive reasons suggests that
agencies that are changing policy need not be convincing; they need
only be aware. It was apparently sufficient that the agency had not
changed its policy accidentally and that it had not actively tried to
conceal the change.
Second, Justice Scalia’s opinion suggested that reasons need not
necessarily be supported by empirical evidence—even when they
make empirical claims. Justice Scalia opined that courts must accept
the reality that “[t]here are some propositions for which scant
empirical evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful effect of
88
broadcast profanity on children is one of them.” According to his
opinion, an agency cannot be expected to conduct its own controlled
experiments testing the effects of indecency on children to support its
89
empirical claims about these effects. More controversially, Justice
Scalia tacitly endorsed the FCC’s failure to address the existing
studies cited by the dissent that found no evidence of a connection
between broadcast profanity and children’s well-being. Thus, the

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4980.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009).
Id. at 1812.
Id.
Id. at 1813.
Id. at 1813–14.
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Court’s new model of administrative reason giving arguably absolves
an agency of the responsibility to locate and address existing research
90
on the subject it is regulating.
Third, Justice Scalia’s opinion suggested that reasons need not
necessarily be apolitical. When an agency has changed its policy, the
Court implied that it would credit the fact that the agency simply
91
“believe[d] [the new policy] to be better” than the old. This signal
opened the door, at least in theory, to arbitrary-and-capricious review
of the type imagined by Justice Rehnquist in State Farm—a level of
review that would defer to agency policies that reflect “the
92
philosophy of the administration.”
To be sure, a more measured reading of Fox than the one I have
93
suggested is possible, and such a reading may, in fact, more
accurately reflect the significance (or lack thereof) of this decision.
Five Justices in Fox disavowed any reliance on politics in the review
94
of agency decisions. A unanimous Court has since affirmed the
95
central importance of rationality in agency policymaking, to some
extent quelling fears about the more radical implications of Fox. This

90. Note that this position stands in stark contrast to the Court’s approach in State Farm, in
which a majority suggested that the DOT should conduct its own studies to resolve gaps and
conflicts in existing research. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 53–54 (1983) (urging the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
to “bring its expertise to bear” on gaps in industry studies regarding the effect of inertia on the
effectiveness of detachable automatic seatbelts).
91. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1811.
92. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
What is perhaps most notable about the Court’s exegesis on administrative reason giving is that
it took place in the context of the adjudication of a regulated entity’s rights in an enforcement
action. Even academic advocates of political reason giving decline to extend their models to the
adjudicatory context, much less to the enforcement context. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 4,
at 1131 (“[A]djudication is beyond the scope of this Article.”); Watts, supra note 4, at 8 n.14
(“In the rulemaking context, agencies act as mini legislatures, whereas agencies act as mini
courts in the adjudicatory context. This distinction may well demand a different role for politics
in rulemaking vs. adjudication.”).
93. See, e.g., Armijo, supra note 18, at 581 (arguing that “at most, Fox means that . . . the
APA does not require an agency to harmonize its past policies when undertaking a new policy
direction outside of notice-and-comment rulemaking”).
94. Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, discusses the
importance of “regulation that does not bend too readily before the political winds.” Fox, 129 S.
Ct. at 1829–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Although Justice Kennedy joins most of Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion, he writes separately to stress that agency policies must be “justified by neutral
principles and a reasoned explanation.” Id. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
95. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 485 (2011) (requiring agencies to limit their
statutory scope “in some rational way”).
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Section’s aim is not to articulate what the Fox decision, taken as a
whole, does or should mean, but instead to highlight the outer
boundaries of what Justice Scalia’s decision in that case could be read
to mean and to suggest how hospitable that reading is to the
politicization of agency reason giving. Although it is not clear what a
valid political reason would look like under Justice Scalia’s analysis,
commentators have already begun exploring the possibilities created
by his approach to administrative reason giving.
B. The Political Turn in Legal Scholarship
Whatever the doctrinal significance of Fox, the case was followed
closely by prominent calls by legal academics for political reason
giving. In the Yale Law Journal, Professor Kathryn Watts argues that
courts should rework the doctrine governing hard-look review to take
96
account of the political reasons for agencies’ decisions. Professor
Nina Mendelson argues in the Michigan Law Review that agencies
should be statutorily required to disclose the political influences on
their actions and that they should receive greater deference on
97
judicial review when those reasons are “public-regarding.” Both
these models of political reason giving build on earlier work by Dean
98
99
Christopher Edley and then-Professor Kagan advocating greater
political control of the bureaucracy and suggesting that deference
doctrines should adopt the flexibility to account for political
influences on agencies. But Professors Watts and Mendelson go much
further in their analysis and advocacy of political reason giving, and
their scholarship thus epitomizes the political turn addressed in this
Article.
Professor Watts argues that traditional conceptions of arbitraryand-capricious review should be expanded beyond what she

96. Watts, supra note 4, at 12–13.
97. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1168. As I have noted, the academic commentary on
political reason giving is confined to the rulemaking context on the theory that political
justifications for the adjudication of individual rights would pose thornier problems. Watts,
supra note 4, at 8 n.14.
98. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990) (providing “a critical exposition of how
administrative law shapes governance, especially through judicial review of actions taken by
executive branch agencies and departments”).
99. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2385 (urging the “modification of certain administrative-law
doctrines in ways that will promote presidential control of administration”).
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on data and
characterizes as a “singular technocratic focus”
expertise. Instead, she contends, arbitrary-and-capricious review
101
should credit “certain political influences.”
She envisions an
approach to arbitrary-and-capricious review that attends to the blend
of statutory, factual, empirical, and political factors that produce
102
administrative decisions. In her scheme, an agency would receive
enhanced deference on judicial review if it could demonstrate that its
103
policy choice had been based on legitimate political reasons.
Professor Mendelson takes a different approach to political
reason giving. Rather than expanding deference doctrine to
encourage the disclosure of political reasons for administrative
actions, she would statutorily require agencies to disclose executive
104
influence on significant rulemaking decisions. Critically, she would
require agencies to disclose not only presidential influences that
might be seen as legitimating, ostensibly justifying greater judicial
deference in the manner envisioned by Professor Watts, but also
105
those that might be seen as delegitimating. Like Professor Watts,
however, Professor Mendelson argues that so long as agencies
disclose all relevant political influences on their decisions, courts
should defer to agencies when those disclosures reveal legitimate
106
political reasons for their actions.
Professors Watts and Mendelson have similar conceptions of
what constitutes a valid political reason deserving of judicial
deference. As a baseline matter, they agree that legitimate political
reasons for an agency’s action must be consistent with the agency’s
107
statutory mandate. Within this domain, they argue that valid

100. Watts, supra note 4, at 84.
101. Id. at 52. Professor Watts includes within the purview of “certain political influences”
those that flow from Congress as well as from the president. Her article’s dominant focus,
however, is on the implications of presidential influence and the article is situated within the
theoretical literature on presidential control. Id. at 8–9. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
address the suggestion that influences from individual members of Congress might warrant
heightened judicial deference toward agency actions.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1130.
105. Id. at 1140–41.
106. Id. at 1175.
107. See id. at 1142 (“[T]he agency remains bound by the statute.”); Watts, supra note 4, at
45 (“[F]ederal administrative agencies . . . must act consistent with congressional intent and
must consider only factors that Congress intended the agency to consider.”). Although both
scholars see this proviso as an important constraint on the executive’s “unfettered discretion to
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political reasons must be public-regarding and must reflect the value
choices of the administration. Professor Watts says that legitimate
108
political influences should embody “some kind of ‘public value’” or
109
be based on “political considerations tied to policy choices.”
Professor Mendelson similarly suggests that courts should defer to
110
political reasons that represent “value preferences or policy calls.”
Critically, both scholars stress that not all types of political
reasons are legitimate. Professor Watts, for instance, would exclude
“raw politics, crass political horse trading, or pure partisanship” from
111
preferential treatment on judicial review. And Professor Mendelson
elaborates that courts should reject political influence as a
justification for administrative action if it (1) advances the personal
interests of the intervening politician or the narrow agenda of some
112
special-interest group, (2) pressures the agency to go beyond the
113
agency’s statutory bounds, or (3) pressures the agency to disregard
114
facts that the agency has found or to find facts in a way that favor a
115
preordained policy prescription.
Applying these heuristics, Professor Watts argues that it would
be illegitimate for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
justify its revocation of a preemption regulation based on the
following reason: “The President directed us to rescind the
direct the outcome of an agency’s decision,” Watts, supra note 4, at 55; see also Mendelson,
supra note 4, at 1134 (noting that these constraints “protect . . . rule-of-law values”), neither
considers the adequacy of this constraint in light of the Chevron doctrine, which arguably makes
administrative agencies the primary arbiters of these statutory boundaries, see Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
108. Watts, supra note 4, at 53.
109. Id. at 54.
110. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1171.
111. Watts, supra note 4, at 54.
112. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1144. The precise overlap between these articulations of
what constitutes a valid political reason and Justice Scalia’s articulation in Fox is not clear. The
most significant issue raised by Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion is when reasons based on values
should trump reasons based on empirical evidence. Although both Professor Watts and
Professor Mendelson maintain that political pressures would be invalid if they caused an agency
to disregard or alter the facts, neither addresses how and where the line between fact-based and
value-based determinations should be drawn in an already politicized administrative
environment in which the two are often blurred.
113. Id. at 1141. It is not clear how significant this limitation is under a Chevron regime that
gives agencies significant latitude to define precisely what those statutory bounds are.
114. Id. at 1142.
115. Id. at 1143.
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preemption regulations in order to reward the trial lawyers, who
116
provided significant campaign support to the President.” Similarly,
she argues, “an agency’s assertion that it adopted a particular
standard . . . because ‘the President made us do it’ should not fare any
117
better.” The first political reason fails, presumably, because it
118
reflects “raw politics” or “crass political horse trading.” The second
119
fails because it does not contain any “public-regarding,” values120
based justification for the president’s policy directive. By contrast, a
valid political reason would look something like the following: In
justifying an action like its 2009 endangerment finding under the
121
Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) might
state, “Our conclusion that carbon dioxide emissions endanger the
public health and welfare serves the President’s overarching policy
goal of protecting the environment and is consistent with the
President’s foreign policy initiatives, including his promises to foreign
leaders that he will work to combat global warming to the extent
122
possible.” This political reason would qualify because it invokes the
broad purposes of the EPA’s statutory scheme and situates the
president’s policy choice in terms of public values recognized by the
statute.
Significantly, these models of political reason giving lodge the
primary responsibility for developing and articulating the substantive
reasons for administrative action with the president rather than with
the agency. In the EPA example, the importance of protecting the
environment and fostering good foreign relations is a justification
articulated, in the first instance, by the president. These reasons are
merely cited by the agency as support for its reliance on the
president’s authority. The model envisions no independent role for
the agency in developing public-regarding political reasons. This
structure of reason giving is very different from the rationalist
paradigm, in which an agency is an active participant in developing
the justifications for its actions. Although no proponent of political
reasons professes to accept as valid an agency’s statement that “the

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Watts, supra note 4, at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 54.
Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1168.
See Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1165.
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
Watts, supra note 4, at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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president made me do it,” a political reason is, at base, a citation by
the agency to the authority of the president, albeit one based on the
good reasons that the president has articulated. In the remainder of
this Article, reasons structured in this way are called “political”
reasons. Reasons based on other sources of authority—legal or
deductive reasoning, empirical evidence, policy analysis, or expertise,
for instance—are encompassed by the “rational” reason-giving
paradigm.
III. THEORIZING POLITICAL REASON GIVING
Although Professors Watts and Mendelson detail the potential
doctrinal and policy benefits that would follow from political reason
giving, they fail to address deeper questions about the function of
reasons and reason giving in the administrative process. They do not
engage with existing rationalist theories of reason giving, and perhaps
more troubling, they fail to articulate their own coherent theory of
administrative reason giving. In this Part, I identify and outline two
theoretical frameworks that seem to have inspired, and that might
arguably accommodate, models of political reason giving—
presidential-control theory and information-disclosure theory—and I
explain why neither provides adequate justification for deference to
political reasons.
A. Presidential-Control Theory
Paving the way for the political turn in administrative reason
giving was a political turn—or, more precisely, a presidential turn—in
theories about the control and legitimation of the bureaucracy.
Presidentialism is rooted in unitary-executive theory, which emerged
in its modern guise in the 1980s as President Reagan attempted to
take the reins of a sprawling bureaucracy whose denizens were often
123
at odds with his policy preferences. Since then, three major strands
of presidential-control theory have developed. The first argues that
strict presidential control of the bureaucracy is constitutionally
124
compelled. The second argues that, even if not constitutionally

123. See Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Executive, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 313, 315–18 (2010) (describing President Reagan’s presidentialism as the “weak
theory of the unitary executive”).
124. E.g., STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 14–15 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549–50
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compelled, strict presidential control of the bureaucracy is
125
normatively desirable. The third argues that strict presidential
control of the bureaucracy is simply an empirical fact that
126
administrative-law doctrine must accommodate.
This Section
reviews each of these positions and draws out the complex
relationship between presidentialism and political reason giving. I
conclude that presidential-control theory does not compel political
reason giving and arguably does not even support it.
1. Different Strands of Presidential-Control Theory. Unitaryexecutive theory holds that the Constitution compels the president’s
127
authority to control personnel and policy in administrative agencies.
Under this view, the president has the constitutional authority to
remove executive officers—and perhaps even civil-service employees
in the executive branch—from their positions if they refuse to comply
128
with the president’s policy directives. Unitary-executive theory also
posits that independent agencies are unconstitutional because, under
the theory, Congress has no authority to assign executive powers to a
129
body that is outside the plenary control of the president.
Although many have questioned claims that the Constitution
130
compels this kind of presidential control over administration, some

(1994); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 730 (2005).
125. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 8, at 2252 (“[I]n comparison with other forms of control,
the new presidentialization of administration renders the bureaucratic sphere more transparent
and responsive to the public, while also better promoting important kinds of regulatory
competence and dynamism.”).
126. See, e.g., id. at 2246 (“We live today in an era of presidential administration.”).
127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
128. Tushnet, supra note 123, at 315; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 124, at 597
(reasoning that Article II, based on structural, historical, and textual arguments, gives the
president a removal power); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers To Administer
the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 293–96 (2006) (distinguishing between a removal power and
directive authority over executive officers).
129. Tushnet, supra note 123, at 319; see also CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 124, at 4
(“[C]ongressional efforts to insulate executive branch subordinates from presidential control by
creating independent agencies and counsels are in essence unconstitutional.”).
130. E.g., JOHN P. MACKENZIE, ABSOLUTE POWER: HOW THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
THEORY IS UNDERMINING THE CONSTITUTION 55 (2008) (arguing that the unitary executive is
not constitutionally compelled); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121
HARV. L. REV. 689, 769 (2008) (arguing that, outside the military context, the Constitution does
not compel a unitary conception of the executive); Louis Fisher, The Unitary Executive:
Ideology Versus the Constitution, in THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND THE MODERN
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have argued that such control is nonetheless normatively desirable
given the immense power exercised by contemporary regulatory
agencies and the imperative to legitimate its exercise. Professors
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, for instance, argue that the
values embodied in the Constitution’s institutional design—in
particular, political accountability and the avoidance of
factionalism—are best served in the contemporary administrative
131
state by strong presidential control over agencies. Then-Professor
Kagan similarly argues that presidential control makes agencies both
more effective and more accountable to the public, a result that
132
enhances their legitimacy.
A third strand of presidentialist argument asserts that regardless
whether the president legally must or normatively should control the
bureaucracy, for all intents and purposes, he does. Then-Professor
Kagan was the first to announce that “[w]e live today in an era of
133
presidential administration.” Professor David Barron has argued
that, since the 1980s, presidents have taken control of the bureaucracy
134
through the political appointment process. And Professors Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule suggest that at the dawn of the twentyfirst century, Americans live in a postliberal world of administered
governance, one in which presidential electoral politics provides the
only meaningful mechanism constraining the actions of the executive
135
branch.
2. Presidential-Control Theory and Political Reason Giving. The
models of political reason giving proffered by Professors Watts and
Mendelson, as well as the one suggested by Justice Scalia in Fox, are
all deeply influenced by presidential-control theory. Justice Scalia has
been the Court’s most outspoken proponent of unitary-executive

PRESIDENCY 17, 17 (Ryan J. Barilleaux & Christopher S. Kelley eds., 2010) (“Although the
framers looked to the president to provide responsibility, accountability, and unity, the model of
the unitary executive was never adopted or intended . . . .”).
131. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
132. Kagan, supra note 8, at 2331–46.
133. Id. at 2246.
134. See David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an
Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2008).
135. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 113–14 (2010) (“[T]he system of elections, the party system, and
American political culture constrain the executive far more than do legal rules created by
Congress or the courts . . . .”).
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136

theory, and his opinion in Fox reflects a deeply antagonistic attitude
137
toward interference with executive prerogatives. Professor Watts
asserts that the prevailing justification for administrative agencies in
the U.S. regulatory state has shifted from an “outmoded” expertisebased model to a “more current” politically based model typified by
presidential-control theories, and she suggests that administrative
138
review should adjust to reflect these changes. Professor Mendelson
likewise starts from the premises that presidents can and do exercise a
great deal of control over the bureaucracy and that executive control
139
has been asserted as a basis for administrative legitimacy.
If the presidentialists are correct that presidential control is
becoming increasingly important as an empirical fact and as a basis
for legitimating agency action, it would seem to follow that
140
administrative law should reflect these changes. What is not clear is

136. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining the fundamental importance of presidential power in the U.S. constitutional scheme
and detailing how the independent-counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 601–602, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–74 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49,
591–598 (2006)), infringed on this power).
137. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1817 (2009) (plurality opinion)
(“There is no reason to magnify the separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the Headless
Fourth Branch by letting Article III judges—like jackals stealing the lion’s kill—expropriate
some of the power that Congress has wrested from the unitary Executive.” (citation omitted)).
138. Watts, supra note 4, at 33.
139. See Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over
Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2456 (2011) (explaining that even scholars who
argue that the president cannot command an agency to issue regulations “concede that the
President may oversee and substantially influence agency decisions”).
140. Presidential-control theories have much to say about the political nature of
administration and the president’s role in it, but they say very little about what those realities
imply for administrative law outside of a few narrow areas. The focus of this literature is on the
president’s ability to control the bureaucracy, primarily through staffing decisions and policy
directives. Thus, discussions of administrative law in this literature are confined largely to the
scope of the president’s constitutional or statutory authority to direct policy, e.g., Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 124, at 549–50; Kagan, supra note 8, at 2319; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note
131, at 2–3; Mendelson, supra note 139, at 2455; Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?
The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 696 (2007); Yoo et al., supra
note 123, at 730, the scope of the president’s appointment and removal powers, e.g., CALABRESI
& YOO, supra note 124; Yoo et al., supra note 124, and Congress’s authority to insulate
administrative agencies from presidential influence, e.g., David P. Currie, The Distribution of
Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19, 19–20; Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies,
1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41. Before the political turn described in this Article, only Dean Edley
and then-Professor, now-Justice Kagan discussed the implications of presidentialism for broader
principles of administrative law, and these analyses were peripheral to their larger projects and
thus not fully developed. See, e.g., EDLEY, supra note 98, at 192–93 (arguing that review should
focus on the quality of the political influences); Kagan, supra note 8, at 2380 (arguing that a
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whether presidential-control theory supports the practice of political
reason giving, and the theory’s proponents have made no sustained
argument explicitly integrating the two or explaining why one should
follow from the other. Although it is conceivable that such an
argument could be made, it would be difficult to make a case for
political reason giving—at least as the practice has been proposed—
based on the premises and normative commitments of presidentialcontrol theory. Political reason-giving models stray outside the
traditional province of presidential-control theory. They do not speak
to the president’s power over policy or bureaucratic personnel, and
they bracket the relationship between presidential and congressional
policymaking power. Instead, they address themselves primarily to
two other governmental institutions: agencies and courts. Specifically,
they ask agencies to justify their actions in terms of their fidelity to
presidential policy preferences, and they ask courts to evaluate more
deferentially agency actions that are so justified. Both demands sit
uneasily with presidential-control theories.
a. Agencies as Political Reason Givers. The first demand,
directed at agencies, is the less controversial of the two, but it is not
without complication, especially under models that would require the
disclosure of political reasons. Such a requirement could divide the
interests of the agency and the president. Agencies will always want
deference, but presidents may not always want the politics of their
141
decisions revealed. If the president has the power to direct agencies
142
to adopt particular policies, as presidentialists assert, it seems clear
that he also has the power to order agencies to make explicit the
political bases for their policy decisions. If, however, the president
does not wish for political justifications to serve as the basis for
administrative action, it seems equally clear that he could ask
agencies to justify their decisions on other grounds, assuming such
grounds are available.
A president might prefer one mode of justification to another for
143
many reasons. For instance, he might believe, as the rationalists do,
modified approach to hard-look review could take into account political factors such as
presidential leadership).
141. See Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1758–60 (2009)
(discussing the presidential preference for secrecy and unitary-executive theory’s support for
presidential secrecy).
142. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part I.B.
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that rational justification can build consensus around a policy,
promoting compliance and thus easing agency enforcement burdens.
The president might be promoting a policy because he has been
persuaded by the rational case for it and thinks the public will be
persuaded, too. Or his preference for nonpolitical reasons might be
based on political strategy—perhaps a desire to highlight his role in
some policies while distancing himself from others. What seems clear,
from the presidentialist perspective, is that such decisions are entirely
within the president’s power to make. It defies logic to encourage
agencies to adopt political justifications in the name of enhancing
executive control when political justifications might turn out to be
contrary to the president’s wishes.
b. Judicial Deference to Legitimate Political Reasons. More
vexing still is the demand that courts give greater deference to agency
decisions that have been justified in legitimate political terms.
Presidential-control theory provides little guidance in this area, as
presidentialists have little to say about courts. Unitary-executive
theory merely “allocates control within the executive branch; it does
not entail a particular relationship between the President and the
144
courts.” Although those who support presidentialism on normative
grounds advocate deferential judicial review of administrative
actions—presumably on the ground that such review will encourage
145
the kind of presidential control they see as desirable —this
proposition has operated as a kind of background assumption in the
literature, one that is unsupported by detailed analysis of the
relationship between courts and the president in the administrative
state. Finally, those who see presidential control of the bureaucracy as
an established fact have quite divergent views on its implications for
judicial review. These views run from those of then-Professor Kagan,
who believes that presidential control warrants greater judicial
146
deference to administrative actions,
to those held by other

144. Stack, supra note 128, at 303.
145. See, e.g., EDLEY, supra note 98, at 192–93 (arguing for a deferential standard of review
for the right kind of political influences); Kagan, supra note 8, at 2380 (arguing for deference
when political leadership and accountability are clear).
146. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2372 (“A sounder version of [Chevron and State Farm]
doctrines of judicial review would take unapologetic account of the extent of presidential
involvement in administrative decisions in determining the level of deference to which they are
entitled.”).
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prominent scholars who argue that it counsels greater judicial scrutiny
147
of administrative actions.
In sum, the existing body of literature contains no clear
indication as to how courts should treat administrative actions that
are the product of presidential control. This uncertainty places a
significant, and as-yet unmet, burden on proponents of political
reason giving to explain why presidential-control theory supports the
kind of relationship they advocate between courts and agencies.
Although this Article does not purport to offer a definitive case
against political reason giving on the ground of presidential control,
making such a case might be difficult for three reasons.
First, models of political reason giving shift the onus for giving
reasons for administrative action from the agency to the president. As
discussed in Part II.B, under the political reason-giving paradigm,
agencies justify their actions based on citations to the authority of the
president, as supported by his articulation of legitimate reasons for
his invocation of that authority. Professor Mendelson defines political
reasons as “those contributed by . . . the President” as well as “White
House officials entrusted with regulatory oversight,” on the theory
that these high-level staff members’ views “are highly likely to reflect
148
the President’s positions.” Similarly, Professor Watts argues that
executive influence that deserves deference comprises presidential
directives and private communications as well as directives from
other high-level White House staff presumed to speak for the
149
president. Thus, if courts are to review political reasons to assess
whether those reasons support agency action, they will be reviewing
reasons developed by the president—or his immediate staff—and not
150
by an agency.

147. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 134, at 1137 (suggesting the need for more stringent review
of agency actions through doctrines that force agencies “to bring their scientific expertise to
bear on controversial questions”); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994) (arguing that in an era of
presidential administration, Americans must make a greater effort to check the president’s
power).
148. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1128–29.
149. Watts, supra note 4, at 57–62.
150. The fact that the agency has adopted the president’s reasons as its own should not
change this analysis. As discussed in Part II.B, an agency’s invocation of the president’s reasons
is ultimately to justify its acquiescence to his authority. This is different from the adoption by an
agency of reasoning from other nonpresidential sources, such as comments submitted in
rulemaking, for instance. Because the agency’s adoption of presidential reasons implicates the

SHORT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1840

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/12/2012 1:56 AM

[Vol. 61:1811

Setting aside the violence this arrangement would do to
151
foundational administrative-law doctrine, the prospect of courts
reviewing reasons developed by the president is highly problematic
from the perspective of presidential-control theory. In Franklin v.
152
Massachusetts, the Court held that the APA does not permit review
of the president’s actions because the president is not an “agency”
153
made subject to the APA’s requirements. Concurring in that case,
Justice Scalia wrote that “[i]t is incompatible with [the president’s]
constitutional position that he be compelled personally to defend his
154
executive actions before a court.” Although proponents of political
reason giving do not contemplate that the president would be called
upon personally to defend the reasons behind his administrative
policies, judicial review of such reasons raises the same kinds of
concerns as does judicial review of the president’s actions directly.
155
In Dalton v. Specter, the Court similarly refrained from
reviewing presidential approval of military-base closures pursuant to
156
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. The Court
reaffirmed its holding in Franklin that the APA does not apply to
presidential action and further held that the Court cannot review
157
presidential exercises of statutory discretion. “How the President
chooses to exercise the discretion Congress has granted him,” the
158
A
majority commented, “is not a matter for our review.”
cornerstone of presidential-control theory is the notion that the
president has the discretion, pursuant to statutes delegating power to
administrative agencies, to gap-fill for the purpose of executing a

exercise of presidential authority, political reason giving raises issues analogous to those raised
in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), and Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
151. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (holding that “an administrative
order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers
were those upon which its actions can be sustained”); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional
Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 955 (2007) (arguing that Chenery established the
bedrock principle of administrative law that the validity of agency action turns on the validity of
the contemporaneous justification the agency has supplied for that action).
152. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
153. Id. at 801.
154. Id. at 827 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
155. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
156. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, tit. XXIX, pt.
A, 104 Stat. 1808 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (2006)).
157. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 470.
158. Id. at 476.
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159

statutory scheme and to issue policy directives ordering agencies to
exercise their discretion under their respective statutory schemes in a
160
161
162
particular way. Whether based on constitutional or statutory
interpretation, this premise is foundational to establishing the
president’s power to control the bureaucracy. Under either view, the
president’s directives to agency administrators represent an exercise
of his statutory discretion. Consequently, those directives are
arguably unreviewable under Dalton.
Second, even if the reasons for presidential actions, as opposed
to the actions themselves, are reviewable, the prospect of courts’
passing on the legitimacy of such reasons would undermine the
normative foundations of presidential-control theory. Models of
political reason giving are quite explicit that courts should defer not
to all political reasons, but only to legitimate political reasons. These
models instruct courts to accept political reasons that reflect “public
163
164
values” or “value preferences or policy calls” but to reject those
that reflect “raw politics, crass political horse trading, or pure
165
partisanship” and those that “slant[] or ignor[e] the results of a
166
scientific or technical analysis.” But presidential-control theory
provides no support for the proposition that courts should pass on the
legitimacy of the president’s reasons for executive action. To the
contrary, it suggests that “any constitutionally permissible policy
decision by an administrative agency that is consistent with its
governing statute and supported by the President should be upheld by
167
the judiciary.”

159. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE
L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006) (describing “the President’s authority to prescribe incidental details
needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of any congressional
authorization to complete that scheme” as “the President’s completion power”).
160. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2302–06 (describing how President Clinton used policy
directives to effectively influence agency healthcare and firearm policies).
161. E.g., Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 159, at 2303–04.
162. E.g., Kagan, supra note 8, at 2251 (“I argue that a statutory delegation to an executive
agency official—although not to an independent agency head—usually should be read as
allowing the President to assert directive authority . . . over the exercise of the delegated
discretion.”); Mendelson, supra note 139, at 2462.
163. Watts, supra note 4, at 53.
164. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1171.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1172.
167. Staszewski, supra note 18, at 873.
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Finally, and also contrary to the normative thrust of presidentialcontrol theory, models of political reason giving ignore fundamental
constitutional separation-of-powers principles. Although presidentialcontrol theories are themselves concerned with the power and
authority of the president, their broader concern is the preservation
168
of constitutional structures that protect the separation of powers.
To effectuate a balanced system of governmental power, the
Constitution allocates authority not only to the president but also to
Congress and the courts. Among other powers, the Constitution
169
confers on Congress the power to create lower federal courts and to
170
define their jurisdiction. This power includes the ability to specify
171
the scope of judicial review of actions taken pursuant to statutes.
Thus, it is impossible to determine how courts should or should not
assess political reasons without first considering precisely what
latitude Congress has given them to review agency actions.
Congress has given the federal courts jurisdiction to review
172
agency actions under the APA and has defined, in the same statute,
the standard under which courts are to review agencies’ policy
decisions. Specifically, courts are to “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
173
law.” Proponents of political reason giving do not deny that
reviewing courts must act within these statutory bounds. But they fail
to explain how deferring to political reasons for agency action
comports with courts’ statutorily conferred review authority. Courts

168. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 131, at 4 (arguing that a unitary conception of
the executive should be adopted because it is the most faithful way to translate the Framers’
structure into a radically changed contemporary political context).
169. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested
in . . . such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
170. Id. art. III, § 2 (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.”); see also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449
(1850) (“Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute
confers. . . . The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of the United States,
but has not prescribed how much of it shall be exercised by [the lower courts]; consequently, the
statute which does prescribe the limits of their jurisdiction, cannot be in conflict with the
Constitution, unless it confers powers not enumerated therein.”).
171. Granted, the Constitution may require a different standard of review—for instance,
concerning actions alleged to violate the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, the Equal
Protection Clause, id. amend. XIV, § 1, or the First Amendment, id. amend. 1.
172. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
173. Id. § 10(e)(B)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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are obliged under the APA’s review standard to set aside agency
actions that are arbitrary or capricious, meaning that they may uphold
only those agency actions that are neither arbitrary nor capricious.
It is not clear how political reasons would assist courts in
dispatching their statutory duty to determine whether an agency
action has surpassed the mandatory threshold of nonarbitrariness. In
fact, politically motivated decisions are often the very definition of
arbitrariness. Presidential policy directives, especially those that
might be insulated from judicial review, depend on the president’s
174
“individual discretion” and do not “adhere to any set scheme” for
175
deciding what policies to adopt. Often they are “not supported” by
176
Political reasons for agency
evidence or rational argument.
decisions may give those decisions many salutary qualities. What they
do not do is render those decisions nonarbitrary. If an agency’s
decision is arbitrary and capricious, the idea that courts may
nonetheless defer to it in defiance of their congressionally conferred
authority is constitutionally suspect.
In sum, political reason giving, as conceptualized by its
proponents, is arguably incompatible with the presidential-control
theories in which it purports to ground itself. To be sure, I do not
dismiss as impossible the project of making a case for presidential
control as a motivating theory of political reason giving. This Article
merely seeks to demonstrate the difficulties that accompany making
such a case and to highlight the absence of any serious attempt to
address these issues. Granted, this line of critique is only applicable if
models of political reason giving do, in fact, rest on presidentialcontrol theory. Proponents of these models may cite presidentialcontrol theory as a referent and a motivation, but it is not entirely
clear that enhancing presidential control is political reason giving’s
normative aim.
As this discussion suggests, models of political reason giving
might be viewed, instead, as subversive of presidential control,
conferring a new source of leverage on agencies that could be used
against the president and subjecting the president’s policy decisions
and political justifications to judicial scrutiny. Professor Mendelson’s
political reason-giving requirement, in particular, is arguably
174. Cf. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 64 (11th ed. 2004) (defining the word
“arbitrary” as “depending on individual discretion”).
175. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 486 (2011).
176. Id. at 490.
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structured as a challenge to theories of presidential control.
Professor Mendelson suggests that it might be necessary to obtain a
better account of what presidential supervision actually entails before
definitively adopting the story that such supervision lends needed
178
legitimacy to administrative agencies. Perhaps, despite the language
of presidential control that frames political reason-giving proposals,
what they actually seek to induce through political reason giving is
the disclosure of information about the nature of the president’s
control over the bureaucracy, with the ultimate end of undermining it.
In the next Section, I evaluate political reason giving as a strategy for
forcing the revelation of this kind of information.
B. Information-Disclosure Theory
Information-disclosure theory provides another possible
theoretical basis for models of political reason giving. Although their
proponents do not explicitly characterize them as such, these models
are designed and justified much like common forms of informationdisclosure regulation, and the revelation of information about the
political bases for administrative decisions appears to be their
primary normative aim. Both Professor Watts and Professor
Mendelson express deep concerns about the “transparency” of the
179
administrative process. This concern verges on suspicion that
agencies are not only opaque but that they are also obfuscating the
real reasons for their actions. Agencies are said to “couch their
decisions in technocratic, statutory, or scientific language, . . . hiding
180
political influences that factor into the mix.” Rationalist reasons are
181
182
said to be “façades” that have “submerged” the real reasons for
agency action. Putting aside for the moment whether such suspicions
are warranted, this Section examines whether an information-

177. Professor Mendelson’s requirement perhaps challenges, for example, then-Professor,
now-Justice Kagan’s view in Presidential Administration, supra note 8.
178. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1141 (“[W]hether presidential influence is a negative
influence on agency decision making, rather than, on another view, the main force shoring up
the administrative state, largely turns on the likely content of that influence, about which we do
not currently possess sufficient information.”).
179. See id. at 1130 (arguing that transparency will increase political accountability and
reduce inappropriate executive influence); Watts, supra note 4, at 33 (arguing that disclosure of
political influences will increase transparency and lead to greater accountability).
180. Watts, supra note 4, at 23.
181. Id. at 42.
182. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1163.
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disclosure regime of the type embodied in political reason-giving
models is likely to reveal the true basis for administrative actions.
Information-disclosure regulation has long been used as a
strategy to force parties to reveal information about themselves that
183
they might otherwise prefer to conceal. The first generation of
information-disclosure policy in the United States grew out of “rightto-know” movements in the 1960s and 1970s that sought more
184
openness and less secrecy in government. Right-to-know laws
sought to inform the public about the workings of government and
typically required simply that the government make existing
185
documents and activities publicly available. As experience with
disclosure regulation developed, the regulation became much more
targeted in its design. Its goals shifted from merely informing the
public to using information as a vehicle for shaping individual
186
behavior to comport with regulatory goals. Targeted informationdisclosure regulation seeks to provide individuals with information
that will steer their choices toward a particular desired regulatory
outcome without explicitly mandating the outcome. So, for instance,
nutrition labels seek to promote healthier diets by giving people the
information they need to select healthier food. Targeted informationdisclosure strategies have been employed in a wide range of
187
188
regulatory arenas, from health and safety hazards to financial risk,
with varying degrees of success.

183. See Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO.
L.J. 449, 460–65 (2012) (stating that “purpose-based” laws achieve this objective).
184. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 24–28 (2007).
185. Id. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), and the Government in the
Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006), are both examples of right-to-know laws.
186. See FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 39 (“[W]hereas right-to-know policies aim to
generally inform public discourse, targeted transparency aims to influence specific choices.”).
187. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2006) (requiring retailers of covered commodities to inform
consumers of a commodity’s country of origin); 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006) (requiring colleges
and universities to report crime statistics for the previous three years and to describe their
crime-prevention programs and procedures for handling sex crimes); 42 U.S.C.
§ 11023(g)(1)(C)(iii)–(iv) (2006) (requiring regulated facilities to report annually the total
amounts of regulated chemicals released into the air, soil, surface water, and offsite locations);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West Supp. 2012) (requiring any person in the
course of business to give a warning if she is aware that an individual will be exposed to a
chemical known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2011) (requiring
nutrition labeling on food packaging).
188. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2011) (providing that a solicitation cannot be made
without first disclosing all relevant information to all shareholders).
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Like other models of information-disclosure regulation, models
of political reason giving either require or incentivize agencies to
reveal information that they might prefer to conceal: the political
bases for their action. Professor Watts’s model rewards agencies with
greater judicial deference for disclosing the public-regarding political
189
bases of their actions. Professor Mendelson envisions a mandatorydisclosure model that would require agencies to reveal all executive
political influences on their actions but that would reward them if
these influences, taken together, reflected the administration’s value
190
preferences or policy calls. Information-disclosure regulation can be
evaluated along three dimensions. First, is the disclosure design likely
to change the behavior of information receivers and disclosers in the
desired way? Second, irrespective of whether it will shape behavior, is
it likely to provide good information or to tell us something that is
both hidden and true about the administrative process? Finally, will
the disclosure design produce any perverse or unintended effects that
might outweigh its benefits?
1. Disclosure of Political Reasons Is Unlikely To Change
Behavior. Political reason-giving models are poorly designed to
shape behavior toward targeted ends. Much research has been
conducted on information-disclosure regulation, resulting in a
sophisticated understanding of the factors that tend to lead to such
regulation’s success or failure. Well-designed information-disclosure
regulation generally has five characteristics: (1) a specified policy
purpose or problem to be solved by disclosure, (2) specified
disclosure targets, (3) a specified scope of information, (4) a defined
information structure and vehicle, and (5) an enforcement
191
mechanism.
In addition, to shape behavior successfully, the
disclosures made under the regulation must become embedded in the
decisionmaking routines of both information receivers and
192
information disclosers.
Although Professors Watts and Mendelson clearly articulate a
policy purpose for political reason giving, their models are not

189. See Watts, supra note 4, at 13 (arguing for courts openly to credit political judgments in
their reviews, enabling them to defer more readily to agency decisions).
190. See Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1163 (arguing for increasing political accountability by
requiring disclosure).
191. FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 39.
192. Id. at 54–55.
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designed to achieve it. The policy purpose of these models is to
enhance the accountability of the political actors who ostensibly
193
control administrative agencies. Professor Watts suggests that
arbitrary-and-capricious review’s focus on the scientific, technical,
and statutory factors that influence agency decisions tends to mask
the political factors at work in these decisions, obscuring political
194
responsibility for agency decisions. Professor Watts contends that
political reason giving can empower citizens to monitor the political
influences on agencies and, presumably, to hold democratically
elected politicians accountable for the choices that they impose on
195
agencies. Professor Mendelson similarly argues that political reason
giving would make the president more accountable to the electorate.
Forcing agencies to disclose the policy preferences imposed on them
by the executive will prevent presidents from transferring blame for
196
unpopular decisions onto “an unelected agency official.” Instead,
the electorate will “see the value-laden aspects of the [agency’s]
197
decision as a reflection of presidential preferences,” enabling voters
to judge the president on the merits of his policy preferences.
Both Professor Watts and Professor Mendelson suggest that
these accountability enhancements would occur through a
straightforward mechanism: Political reasons will tether the president
more closely to the actions he directs agencies to take. This tethering
effect, in turn, will allow the electorate to hold him responsible at the
ballot box for these actions. The prospect of electoral discipline will
shape the president’s behavior while in office, thereby prompting him
198
to promote policies that the electorate supports. Unfortunately,
political reason-giving models are unlikely to promote this behavioral
cycle.
The first significant design defect in these models is their
confusion over the disclosure targets for the information contained in
political reasons. If models of political reason giving seek ultimately

193. See Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1161 (discussing the virtues of “greater disclosure to
the electorate”); Watts, supra note 4, at 42 (calling enhanced political accountability “perhaps
the most important reason” for political reason giving).
194. See Watts, supra note 4, at 43 (suggesting that political reason giving could reduce the
“monitoring gap” that often thwarts the detection of political influence on agency decisions).
195. See id. (explaining the “accountability benefits” that would ensue from disclosure).
196. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1165.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1163–66 (explaining how agencies could become more politically accountable
through greater disclosure of their influences); Watts, supra note 4, at 42–44 (same).
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to shape the behavior of voters, one would think that citizens would
be the target audience for this information. But the disclosure format
envisioned—in the Federal Register, along with all of the agency’s
other reasons for a given action—is highly unlikely to reach this
audience. Although Federal Register publication would make political
reasons publicly available as a formal matter, as a practical matter it
would mean that those reasons never reach the vast majority of
citizens. To state the obvious, “[d]isclosees cannot use information
199
until they get it.” Courts represent another possible target of
political reasons, but it is not clear that the receipt of political reasons
by courts for purposes of arbitrary-and-capricious review will have
any effect on the behavior of voters. And the models do not theorize
the mechanism through which courts might serve as an information
intermediary for the citizens who are to hold politicians accountable
for their regulatory policies.
Of course, watchdog groups and the media might monitor the
200
Federal Register and court dockets, much as they already do, and
report political-influence disclosures to the public. But they would
necessarily do so selectively, depriving citizens of a full picture of
presidential influence and perhaps unfairly characterizing the nature
of that influence. Moreover, as commentators point out, “[T]he
conditions under which such groups form and become engaged as
201
agents of information users are often very demanding” —these
groups often form in times of crisis, and public attention generally
202
fades as soon as the crisis is over —so it cannot be assumed that such
groups will serve as effective information intermediaries. At the very
least, the potential influence of political disclosures will be blunted by
the fact that whatever information reaches citizen-targets will not
reach them directly, but will first be filtered through some third party.
This confusion around a fundamental design element seriously
undermines the ability of information-disclosure policies to shape
behavior. “Successful transparency policies . . . place the individuals
203
and groups who will use information at center stage,” but the
199. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 647, 709 (2011).
200. See FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 42 (explaining the role of intermediary groups in
compelling risk disclosure).
201. Id.
202. See id. at 106, 110 (describing the crisis-driven formation of information
intermediaries).
203. Id. at 11.
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citizens who ostensibly drive the electoral-discipline mechanism
underlying Professor Watts’s and Professor Mendelson’s envisioned
policies do not even appear to be in the theater.
Even if citizens do ultimately receive the information contained
in the political reasons that are provided by agencies, that
information will shape their electoral choices only if it becomes
embedded in their decisionmaking routines. Information is most
likely to embed itself when three conditions are present. First,
204
receivers must perceive the benefit of getting the information.
Second, the information must be disclosed in a way that is compatible
205
with the way people typically make decisions. Third, receivers must
be able to comprehend the information disclosed and, specifically, “to
206
relate it to the decisions they face.”
Political reason giving meets none of these criteria. First, there
has been no broad public demand for more information about the
political control of the bureaucracy, much less for information about
the intricacies of, say, review by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). People tend to make political, and
207
especially presidential, decisions based on much different criteria.
That voters desire the kind of information contemplated by
208
Professors Watts and Mendelson is not at all clear.
Second, disclosure in the Federal Register is likely to be remote
in time from when most citizens are focused on electoral decisions

204. See id. at 55 (“Few people spend time and energy obtaining information for its own
sake. Most people must perceive that the information will be valuable in achieving their
goals.”).
205. Id. at 56.
206. Id. at 59.
207. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND
CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002) (arguing that political preferences are determined by
deeply ingrained cognitive structures that can be triggered by political rhetoric); DREW
WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE
NATION (2007) (providing evidence from clinical-psychology research on the emotional basis of
political decisionmaking).
208. Although it is true that the media have demanded information in certain high-profile,
politicized administrative decisions, such as OIRA’s refusal to open an e-mail from EPA
regarding its greenhouse-gas-endangerment finding during President George W. Bush’s
administration or President Barack Obama’s request that the EPA withdraw its final National
Ambient Air Quality Standard for ozone pollution, it is not clear that the catalyst for these
demands was voting citizens. Moreover, even if the demand is citizen-driven, the fact that events
such as these have been widely reported in the popular press suggests that the information is
available and is being disseminated in fora that are far more accessible to citizens than court
filings or Federal Register notices.
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and remote from the location where they actually cast their votes.
Disclosed information is most likely to shape behavior when it is
made “available at a time and place where users are accustomed to
209
This is why the FDA places nutrition
making decisions.”
information directly on products at the point of purchase rather than
in some agency archive. By contrast, disclosed political reasons for
agency actions do not have the same kind of immediacy and
relevance to voters’ decisions.
Finally, even if the information encapsulated in politicalinfluence disclosures were to reach citizens at a time and in a format
that made it relevant to their voting decisions, they might not
comprehend either the information itself or its relation to their
electoral choices. Information receivers in all contexts have difficulty
understanding the information that is disclosed to them. Many are
210
211
functionally illiterate, still more are “innumerate” —that is, have
trouble comprehending mathematical and probabilistic information—
and all have a well-catalogued list of inherent cognitive limitations
212
that inhibit their ability to make sense of the information they get.
These limitations have been observed among receivers of even
relatively straightforward information, such as the fat content of food
213
or the presence of carcinogens in consumer products. Information
about political influences on agency policymaking decisions is vastly
more complex, not least because, as proponents of political reason
214
giving admit, it has no fixed normative valence. Unlike carcinogens
in food, political influence is not self-evidently good or bad, nor is it
something obviously to be avoided or encouraged. The chance of

209. FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 57.
210. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 711.
211. Id. at 712; see also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1440–44 (1999)
(arguing that consumers do not understand and are often tricked by disclosed numbers); Paul
Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 281 (1987) (arguing that individuals’ nonnumerical
perceptions of risk affect outcomes).
212. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 670 (describing a study that found
multiple cognitive limitations that rendered disclosure ineffective, including motivations,
thought processes, and the perceived uncertainties of science); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 211,
at 1451 (arguing that manufacturers can successfully manipulate perceptions of risk).
213. Hanson and Kysar, supra note 211, at 1451, 1467–68; see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 667
(1993) (observing that, because of the way people process information, risk disclosure can cause
people to dramatically overestimate risks).
214. See supra Part II.B.
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influencing receiver behavior under these circumstances is
vanishingly small.
Even if these barriers could be overcome, one more set of
daunting conditions must be met for information to create a virtuous
cycle of behavior: information disclosures must bend the
decisionmaking curve not only of information receivers but also of
215
information providers. The Toxic Release Inventory was deemed a
success not because it prompted neighbors of polluting factories to
move, but rather because it changed the way that those factories
measured and managed toxic releases, resulting in significant
216
emissions declines. Similarly, saccharine labeling was deemed to be
effective not because wealthy, well-educated consumers understood
the information and were able to avoid personally ingesting products
made with the carcinogen but because that powerful group of
consumers created demand pressure that induced manufacturers to
217
reformulate their products.
Likewise, the litmus test for political reason giving should be not
merely whether voters are able to use the information obtained to
make better electoral decisions and to throw out politicians who
deviate from electoral preferences each election cycle, but whether
the prospect of such electoral discipline changes the decisionmaking
function of politicians while they are in office, making them more
likely to choose policies that the electorate favors. For this dynamic to
occur, politicians must perceive and comprehend the altered choices
of voters and understand those altered choices as responding to
218
disclosed information.
Information-disclosure regulation can
discipline the behavior of disclosers only if the information disclosed
ends up “being routinely incorporated into management routines and

215. The Toxic Release Inventory, created by the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-To-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2006)), created a publicly available database containing information on
toxic chemical releases emitted by industrial facilities in the United States. E.g., Am. Chem.
Council v. Johnson, 406 F.3d 738, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
216. JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS,
AND IMPACTS OF THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM 230–31 (2005); MICHAEL E.
KRAFT, MARK STEPHAN & TROY D. ABEL, COMING CLEAN: INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 53–55 (2011).
217. See Sunstein, supra note 213, at 664 (“The data show that after the warning labels [for
diet soft drinks containing saccharin] were required, there were significant adverse effects on
sales. The initial effects were produced primarily by well-educated and high-income
households.”).
218. FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 6.
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219

decisionmaking processes.” Disclosures must not be merely discrete
exercises; they must be part of an iterative process that feeds back to
220
the disclosing organization, shaping the way that it does business.
When the receiver’s response to information is as attenuated as it is in
this context, it will have little, if any, disciplinary effect on the
behavior of disclosers. As one source comments, if receivers “respond
to information in ways that do not directly affect disclosers, the
221
behavior of disclosers is unlikely to change.” If the information
provided to the electorate by political reason giving does not change
politicians’ behavior while they are in office, it will not provide
accountability in any meaningful sense.
In sum, the provision by agencies of political reasons for their
actions is unlikely to affect the behavioral dynamics of presidential
voting and thus of presidential behavior in office. Of course, even if
the information provided by political reasons fails to change behavior
in accountability-enhancing ways, it might still have some inherent
value, satisfying citizens’ “right to know” what their government is up
to, in the tradition of “sunshine” policies. Accepting the implicit
222
presumption that political motivations for agency action are hidden,
the question then becomes whether the disclosure of political reasons

219. HAMILTON, supra note 216, at 230.
220. See KRAFT ET AL., supra note 216, at 31 (“Disclosure of information to the public
creates a dynamic which spurs industrial facilities to improve their environmental
performance.”).
221. FUNG ET AL., supra note 184, at 66.
222. Whether the political reasons that agencies give are likely to tell Americans anything
they do not already know, at least at some level of abstraction, about political involvement in
administration is unclear. Ordinary citizens have proven quite capable of attributing
administrative actions to the political and values-based motives of the president. See, e.g., Molly
Worthen, Leaps of Faith, N.Y. TIMES, CAMPAIGN STOPS BLOG (Mar. 1, 2012, 10:23 PM), http://
campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/leaps-of-faith (describing how a decision by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to require most nonchurch employers to
provide their employees with insurance that covers birth control was viewed by many as an
effort by President Obama to oppress religious expression and undermine religious values in
favor of his own and his supporters’ secular values). Research has also suggested that citizens’
perceptions of the president’s values-based motives for policy already influence their electoral
decisions, perhaps even more than their economic or material interests. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE
RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012). An
agency’s disclosure that a particular decision was influenced in a particular way by the publicregarding value choices of the sitting administration would add little to the existing levels—or
accuracy—of public knowledge about political influence, given information-processing and
comprehension constraints. Worse, a political reason-giving model that credited only publicregarding political reasons would be unlikely to elicit additional information from agencies
about the less savory political motivations behind agency actions.
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for agency action provides citizens with high-quality information that
reveals something true about the administrative process and the
president’s role in it.
2. Disclosure of Political Reasons Is Unlikely To Reveal HighQuality Information. Economic theory describes two ways of
revealing hidden information: disclosure and signaling. Disclosure is
223
the direct revelation of hidden information, whereas signaling is the
indirect communication of hidden information through costly
224
actions. These mechanisms can provide valuable tools for revealing
hidden information, but only under certain conditions. Disclosure can
reveal hidden information accurately when revelation is both
voluntary and costless or when revelation is both mandatory and
225
policed by strong enforcement for misrepresentation. When these
conditions are absent, direct revelation of information is likely to be
no more than “cheap talk,” revealing no information of value,
especially if preferences are misaligned between the discloser and the
226
receiver. Signaling, by contrast, seeks to overcome the pitfalls of
disclosure by directing attention to an actor’s choices or actions—
rather than to her direct statements—to communicate hidden
227
information. Signaling reveals hidden information effectively when
the actions taken by “good types” to signal the high quality of their
products—or the high-mindedness of their motivations—would be
228
too costly for “bad types” to imitate.

223. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 531 (9th ed. 2009).
224. See Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434, 436–39 (2002)
(illustrating the basic signaling model in the job market, in which a potential employee’s level of
education is used as a proxy for that potential employee’s future productivity).
225. See Robert H. Gertner, Disclosure and Unravelling, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 605, 605–06 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (“The
foundation of the theory of verifiable-information disclosure is the unravelling result. The
unravelling result is simply that if certain conditions[—including costless information
transmission—]hold, all verifiable information will be revealed.”).
226. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, Cheap Talk, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 751, 751–52 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
227. Id. at 751.
228. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 20–21 (2002). In the classic example, usedcar dealers tend to rely on signals rather than disclosure to communicate the truth to consumers
about the quality of their cars. Because it is difficult for inexpert consumers to confirm the
veracity of direct claims about auto quality, they tend to rely on the sellers’ actions, such as their
willingness to offer warranties on their cars, to ascertain its quality. Cf. George Akerlof, The
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970)
(using the used-car market to illustrate problems posed by asymmetry of information between
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Political reason giving is a disclosure regime that seeks to induce
agencies directly to reveal the political bases for their actions.
Professor Watts’s design is particularly ill suited for producing
meaningful disclosures. Professor Watts would encourage, but would
not require, the disclosure of political reasons, by rewarding agencies
with deference if they disclose political influence truthfully and if the
229
disclosed political influence is public-regarding. The model contains
no enforcement mechanism for punishing incomplete or inaccurate
disclosures. Agencies would be, in essence, invited to disclose good
information about themselves in exchange for a reward. This
arrangement would surely create incentives for agencies to offer what
they might regard as salutary political reasons for their actions, but it
would offer no incentive for them to disclose less savory political
reasons for their actions. Political reason giving under this model
would provide only one side of the story, thus opening the door to a
230
cacophony of “cheap talk” about the basis of agency decisions.
Professor Mendelson’s mandatory-disclosure model is better
designed, in theory, to elicit meaningful information. Professor
Mendelson would require agencies to reveal all executive influences
on their rulemaking, regardless of whether those influences might be
231
perceived as good or bad. Her model also contains an enforcement
mechanism: courts would not uphold rules if these influences had not
232
been completely and accurately disclosed.
Although mandatory disclosure may avoid reward-driven cheap
talk, it has its own set of pitfalls. First, disclosers often simply resist or
233
ignore mandates, especially when enforcement mechanisms are
weak or uneven. Because courts would have difficulty determining
whether all relevant executive influence on an agency decision had

the buyer and the seller and observing that warranties can “counteract” the effects of quality
uncertainty”).
229. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
230. Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary
Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing?, 54 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing
that voluntary programs that offer firms rewards for self-regulating are likely to be ineffective).
Conceivably, courts faced with an ongoing parade of commendable political reasons might
begin to question those reasons’ veracity, but Professor Watts’s model provides no account of
the mechanism by which mere questioning might discipline agencies into providing negative
information about themselves. And the model does not explain or justify the power of judges
and litigants to inquire into undisclosed political reasons for agency action.
231. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
233. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 700.

SHORT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

POWER, RATIONALITY, AND REASONS

4/12/2012 1:56 AM

1855

been fully and truthfully disclosed without running up against thorny
234
separation-of-powers issues, courts are unlikely to be vigorous
enforcers of that requirement, and agencies might be able to resist it
with impunity. Second, when a mandate is stated in broad terms,
disclosers often interpret it—either conservatively or strategically—to
235
require the disclosure of every last detail. This response produces
disclosures so detailed and exhaustive that they can be
236
unintelligible. Third, disclosure mandates are often met with
creative compliance strategies that put a positive spin on the negative
237
facts sought to be disclosed. For instance, as Professors Omri BenShahar and Carl Schneider explain, when health plans were required
to reveal the basis for incentive payments to their doctors, “‘almost
none’ mentioned ‘the potential negative impact that incentive
arrangements might have on physician behavior.’ They more often
bathed ‘incentives in a positive light’ by saying, for example, that they
238
rewarded better care.” The political influences on agencies likely
would be spun in a similar fashion.
Finally, disclosers often “obey the letter of a mandate but flout
239
its spirit,” engaging in symbolic or “[m]echanical compliance.” The
same kind of boilerplate that stands in for meaningful disclosure in a

234. See Joel D. Bush, Congressional-Executive Access Disputes: Legal Standards and
Political Settlements, 9 J.L. & POL. 719, 719 (1993) (“Executive privilege is based on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and exempts the executive branch from certain
disclosure requirements if an exemption is necessary for carrying out important executive
responsibilities that are part of official government duties.”); see also Stephen C.N. Lilley,
Suboptimal Executive Privilege, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1127, 1132 (describing the courts’ tendency
to abstain from disputes over executive privilege). But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
711 (1974) (holding that executive privilege, although “constitutionally based,” does not
override the right to production of all evidence in a criminal trial). Although United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), did confront the issue of executive privilege, the case is widely relied
upon to support the assertion that the president’s discussions with advisors are generally
confidential because of the need for “complete candor and objectivity.” Id. at 706; see also Jay S.
Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
104 YALE L.J. 51, 110–11 (1994) (quoting the “complete candor and objectivity” language in
support of the same assertion).
235. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 684; see also Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming
Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629, 1632 (2009) (arguing
that a broad mandate to disclose certain tax-shelter transactions led to overdisclosure by
taxpayers, hampering Internal Revenue Service enforcement efforts).
236. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 686–87.
237. See id. at 700 (mentioning ways that disclosers can resist mandates).
238. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Mark A. Hall, The Theory and Practice of Disclosing
HMO Physician Incentives, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 227 (2002)).
239. Id. at 701.
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variety of consumer-disclosure arenas might also come to dominate
the discourse of political reasons. For instance, regulations repealing
environmental protections, granting trade preferences, promoting
green energy, enacting federal curriculum standards, or revising
Medicare coverage could all be justified on the grounds that they
comport with a president’s public-regarding program to, say, “rebuild
the foundations of the American economy on the principles of free
240
enterprise, hard work, and innovation.” An administration will
always be able to conjure some broad, public-regarding principle for
its policy preferences, but this principle will likely do little to convey
the real politics behind any particular decision. The recitation of
political platitudes in support of administrative policies would
seriously undermine the goal of enhancing meaningful political
discourse and accountability.
3. Disclosure of Political Reasons May Have Unintended Costs.
Even if political reason giving is not optimally designed to produce
the desired information, one might argue that it will produce some
amount of new information—albeit of varying quality—and that more
information is always better than less information. In considering
whether to seek disclosure of this additional information,
policymakers should consider what the costs of obtaining it might be.
First, as Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider observe, new
sources of information “can crowd out useful information” that
241
already exists.
Information disclosers have finite informationgeneration and disclosure capacities. Thus, a directive to focus on the
political reasons for agency action may shift resources away from the
production of information about other reasons supporting agency
action.
Second, information receivers similarly have finite informationretention and processing abilities, and new disclosures may prevent
them from acquiring or comprehending other information that may
242
turn out to be more important. Political reasons seem especially
likely to induce such a crowding-out effect because they are

240. This particular political platitude was taken from Mitt Romney’s presidential-campaign
website. Jobs and Economic Growth, ROMNEY: BELIEVE IN AMERICA, http://www.mittromney
.com/jobs (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
241. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 737 (emphasis omitted).
242. Id.; Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 566 (2006).
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inherently more comprehensible than rational reasons. The rational
reasons given to support agency policy decisions—including policy
analysis, synthesis of conflicting empirical data, and explanations of
how different interests have been mediated—can be extraordinarily
complex and thus difficult to digest and understand. By contrast, a
statement that the agency has adopted a policy because that policy
comports with the president’s view of the public interest is a simple
cause-effect account that is cognitively straightforward to
comprehend. Given both types of reasons, the one that is simpler and
243
more straightforward is the one that is likely to stick. Because
information-processing and retention capacities are limited, the more
straightforward account is likely to crowd out information contained
in other accounts.
These information-processing mechanisms suggest two
significant problems with political reason giving as an informationforcing device. First, political reason giving would not generate more
information about the administrative process; it would generate
different information about the administrative process. This reality
raises the question whether the information that political reason
giving produces is the focal narrative that should be told about
administrative policymaking. The administrative process is much
richer and more complex than the political context in which it occurs.
To focus citizens’ limited cognitive capacities on politics, to the
possible exclusion of other aspects of the process—such as the
attempt to translate scientific knowledge into policy insight or the
struggle to reconcile competing interests or determine what policy
values are in the interest of the broader society—would both degrade
policy discourse and diminish the universe of what observers can
know about administration. Second, the fact that political reasons are
cognitively simpler to comprehend does not render them any truer or
more accurate than other kinds of reasons. If the core goal of political
reasons is simplification, they achieve it admirably. They are less
likely, however, to reveal deeper truths about the administrative
process.
4. Signaling as an Alternative to Disclosure. None of this
discussion means that citizens and courts are consigned to ignorance

243. See Sunstein, supra note 213, at 670–71 (“Excessive detail should be avoided; the
relevant information should be crisp and simple. Any disclosure requirements should attend to
difficulties in processing information.”).
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about the political bases for administrative action. The political
reason-giving project itself suggests that people know quite a bit
about the political bases for administrative action, both as a general
matter and in specific cases. In addition, research suggests that
existing administrative-law doctrine builds in signals about the level
of political support for a given administrative action. These signals
arguably provide more credible information than direct statements
would about a given policy’s consistency with the president’s policy
244
preferences. Hard-look review calls upon agencies to disclose the
rational bases of their actions under penalty of remand if the evidence
245
or explanation is insufficient. This design is mandatory and contains
a clear enforcement mechanism. Disclosures made pursuant to this
regime convey a great deal of information about the logical and
empirical bases for an agency’s decisions. Moreover, in addition to
the direct information these reasons provide about the rational bases
for agency decisions, they also send a signal about the level of
political support for those decisions. Justifying agency actions in a
way that will survive hard-look review is, as many have observed, a
246
costly endeavor. The fact that an agency has invested significant

244. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency
Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 470 (2007) (“[T]he effect of the [cost that an agency must
incur to adopt a new regulation] on agency expertise depends on whether the agency would
adopt the new regulation if its efforts to acquire additional information are unsuccessful.”);
Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 755 (2006) [hereinafter Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory] (arguing
that “judicially-imposed explanation requirements can help reviewing courts overcome their
comparative informational disadvantage for reasons that are independent of the (in)ability of
courts to understand or verify the substantive content of the justifications advanced by
government decisionmakers” and assuming that “the court can use the quality of the
government’s explanation . . . as a rough proxy for the costs the government incurred in
producing this explanation”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Evidentiary Standards and Information
Acquisition in Public Law, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 351, 377 (2008) (“Allowing action without
hard evidence dampens research incentives; allowing action in the presence of adverse evidence
strengthens research incentives.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and
Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1427 (2011) (“[D]ifferent institutional
arrangements (arrangements that are often determined or shaped by law) might affect the
production of useful information by government agents.”).
245. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
246. Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To Modify
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 498–99 (1997);
Sidney A. Shapiro, Substantive Reform, Judicial Review, and Agency Resources: OSHA as a
Case Study, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 645, 652 (1997); see also John S. Applegate, Worst Things First:
Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG.
277, 286 (1992) (“The government has finite resources with which to investigate problems,
develop regulations, and enforce its decisions. A major regulatory initiative that will have a
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resources in a decision is likely to indicate not only that the decision
has been carefully researched and considered and is rationally
justifiable, but also that it has strong political support.
Professor Matthew Stephenson demonstrates in formal models
that the rationalist reason-giving requirement of hard-look review has
significant information-forcing qualities. In addition to the
information it conveys by its terms, the requirement signals to
inexpert, apolitical judges the level of support a policy has received
247
from the administration. Professor Stephenson argues that an
agency’s willingness and ability “to produce a high-quality
explanation signals that the government believes the benefits of the
248
proposed policy are high.” Moreover, agencies with little political
support for their agendas probably could not fake such signals
249
consistently. Thus, the quality of an agency’s rational explanation
for its policy provides reviewing courts with important information
about the political support for agency decisions that may be more
reliable than direct disclosure. Under a political reason-giving regime,
agencies could recite boilerplate language asserting that their policies
are consistent with the president’s public-regarding political agenda,
but they would have difficulty surviving hard-look review if the
administration were not actually putting resources behind them.
Thus, the signals sent by rationalist reasons may be a better
mechanism than direct disclosure for producing information about
the level of political support for administrative policy. Recognizing
these dynamics, Professors Posner and Vermeule call for the
development of “institutional mechanisms that impose heavier costs

significant economic impact on the regulated industry is likely to be, for that reason alone,
highly controversial.” (footnote omitted)); McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 37, at 1392
(“[T]he agencies are understandably reluctant to rock the boat when to do so requires an
enormously expensive rulemaking in which a successful outcome is by no means assured.”);
Pierce, Judicial Review of Agency Actions, supra note 37, at 70 (“Many administrative law
doctrines have powerful effects on the amount of resources an agency must expend to perform a
statutorily assigned mission.”).
247. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory, supra note 244, at 755.
248. Id. It is important to note that other considerations, apart from political support, drive
agency resource-allocation decisions. For instance, the existence of statutory deadlines may
drive investments of agency resources. The existing literature focuses on political support, but
its insights may apply more broadly to other strong bases of authority for administrative action,
such as statutory or judicially imposed deadlines.
249. Although agencies sometimes invest significant resources in an effort to bulletproof
policies that are politically controversial—as opposed to politically well-supported—agencies
would be unlikely to engage in such a strategy successfully over the long term and against the
wishes of an antagonistic administration.
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on ill-motivated” executive actors to hinder self-serving
characterizations of executive action and to amplify the credibility of
the signals that well-meaning executives send about their policy
250
To the extent that information forcing is the
commitments.
normative goal of political reason giving, it may already be served
adequately by conventional models of administrative reason giving.
In sum, the case for political reason giving is not supported by
the theoretical frameworks in which that model is grounded. Even if
the political reason-giving model fails to provide a viable alternative
to rationalist theories of reason giving, however, its great contribution
is that it forces a critical examination of rationalist theories and, in
particular, the relationship between reason and power in governance.
The deep flaw of rationalist theories is their suggestion that power
somehow can be separated from or tempered by rationality. The
virtue of reasons, in the rationalist account, is that they insulate
citizens from the raw exercise of government power. There is
something deeply unsatisfying about such a claim, about the way it
obfuscates the arbitrary abuses of power that occur every day within
251
rationalized legal systems, and about the way it brackets the
inevitable presence of political power behind all administrative
action. As an alternative to rationalist models, however, political
reason giving does little better. From this perspective, reasons do not
temper power; they mask it. The work of reasons, from a political
perspective, is not to rationalize, but to reveal the power behind
administrative action so that it can be tempered electorally.
The problem with both perspectives is that they see reason and
power as distinct from and in tension with each other, and this
understanding leads them to characterize reason giving as external to
the political power dynamics within agencies. In both conceptions,
reason giving is a means of imposing external sources of discipline on
agencies. What is largely missing from these perspectives is an

250. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 135, at 122–23.
251. See, e.g., JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, ANDREW IAN SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP G. SCHRAG,
REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM (2009) (performing a statistical analysis of outcomes in asylum adjudications and
concluding “that the outcome of a refugee’s quest for safety in America should be influenced
more by law and less by a spin of the wheel of fate that assigns her case to a particular
government official”); Mashaw, supra note 57, at 29 (rejecting “general explanations
for . . . discontent with the rationalized administrative state” and asserting that at an extreme,
“there is no real difference between the administrative rationality of the U.S. Social Security
administration and the administrative rationality of the Rwandan military police”).
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understanding of reason giving as a social practice that shapes
administrative behavior intrinsically. The next Part outlines a theory
of administrative reason giving as a social and organizational practice
that fundamentally shapes the way administrative agencies look and
the actions they take. These kinds of constraints are critical in a
sprawling administrative apparatus that simply cannot be controlled
by one individual—or her deputies—using hierarchical command.
The real danger of political reason giving is that it would undermine
these intrinsic sources of discipline without offering any alternative
means of controlling agencies and getting things done.
IV. TOWARD A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF REASON GIVING
Social theory posits a number of functions served by both
reasons themselves and the practice of reason giving. Reasons help
human actors make sense of complex events. They “provide
interpretations and explanations of experience. They make actions
252
imaginable and consequences interpretable.” In this way, reasons
construct how actors perceive the world and invest it with meaning.
Similarly, the imperative to give reasons constructs individuals and
organizations as particular types of actors and defines the terms on
253
which they can sustain social ties with one another. Reason giving
may not itself promote democratic deliberation or rationalize power
as the rationalist account would maintain. It may not itself promote
presidential control or electoral accountability as the political account
would maintain. What reason giving does, however, is create social
relationships and organizational structures that tend to channel the
exercise of agency discretion within politically and socially acceptable
parameters.
The social and organizational framework supported by reason
giving empowers agencies to do their jobs; it regularizes—if not
rationalizes—the way that they do these jobs in reasonably
predictable ways, and it constrains the kinds of actions that agencies
deem possible and desirable to take. It does so through two

252. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 141 (1995)
(citations omitted).
253. See LUC BOLTANSKI & LAURENT THÉVENOT, ON JUSTIFICATION: ECONOMIES OF
WORTH 41 (Catherine Porter trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (1991) (“Very diverse
beings . . . turn out to be connected and arranged in relation to one another in groupings that
are sufficiently coherent for their involvement to be judged effective, for the expected processes
to be carried out, and for the situations to unfold correctly . . . .”).
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mechanisms. First, reason giving constitutes agencies as organizations,
shaping everything from routine staffing decisions to agency culture
and the cognitive scripts that guide agency decisionmaking processes.
Second, reason giving structures agencies’ interactions with citizens
and with other legal and political institutions. In both respects, reason
giving fundamentally shapes what agencies look like and how they
act. In this Part, I discuss each of these mechanisms and explain how
political reason giving would undermine them.
A. Reason Giving Constitutes Agencies as Organizations
For better or for worse, hard-look review has deeply influenced
the organizational structure of contemporary administrative agencies.
Agencies hire experts to study and corroborate their policy decisions,
staff to review and respond to comments, economists to evaluate the
costs and benefits of different policies, and lawyers to draft preambles
explaining the reasons for policy decisions and to defend agency
actions. Although all of this activity may be driven by the prospect of
either reversal on judicial review or discipline by the executive, these
professionals, occupying defined roles within the agency organization,
shape and constrain the agency’s behavior on a day-to-day basis. The
imperative to give reasons also shapes the culture of administrative
agencies, or the way the agencies understand themselves as
organizations. Taken together, these elements of an organization’s
culture create taken-for-granted understandings about what it is
possible and desirable for the organization to do. The following
Sections first provide a general overview of theories of organizational
structure and control and then discuss how key organizational
structures that empower and constrain administrative agencies are
supported by hard-look review and would be undermined by political
reason giving.
1. Structural Mechanisms That Shape and Constrain
Organizations. Although they often occupy a rarefied space in the
political and legal imagination, political institutions like agencies and
legislatures are, at base, organizations. Organizations are social
groups that have been “established for the explicit purpose of
254
achieving certain goals.” Organizations pursue these goals, in part,
by establishing structures and social relationships to channel the
254. PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 5 (1962).
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decision processes and behaviors of individual members. Thus, the
behavior of actors in political institutions is a function not only of the
distribution of political preferences and resources but also of the way
256
those organizations are structured. Four broad types of structural
mechanisms shape and constrain the way decisions are made within
organizations: (1) specialization and division of labor,
(2) standardized routines, (3) formal and informal authority
257
structures, and (4) staff training.
First, organizations typically divide labor in a way that allows
258
individuals to specialize and focus on discrete tasks. Within the
organization, this practice creates groups of individuals who not only
are focused on similar activities but who also often share similar
259
professional or personal values. Depending on the power of these
internal constituencies, their values can come to shape the
organization’s decisionmaking practices and understanding of its
260
mission more broadly. A famous example of this phenomenon in
the organizational literature is the “flak-catching” office:
[F]lak-catchers, who are commissioned to protect an organization
from flak and to symbolize a commitment to deal appropriately with
flak, quickly learn to enhance the importance of flak. The
mechanisms are familiar. Partly, flak-catchers are chosen because of
some willingness to deal with outsiders, perhaps because of prior
affinity to them. Partly, they learn from their association with
outsiders to identify with them. Partly, they discover that their
261
importance in the organizations depends on the existence of flak.

255. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 102–03 (1948) (describing the
mechanisms “organization[s] employ[] to influence the decisions of individual members”).
256. See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational
Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 738 (1984) (describing how organizational
structure and procedure help support political institutions).
257. SIMON, supra note 255, at 102–03.
258. Id. at 102.
259. See, e.g., SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 6 (1984) (arguing that
“[e]nvironmental analysts not only help their agency by pointing out legal and political
vulnerabilities on environmental issues, but also tend to have distinctive personal values”).
260. See CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION
AND DEMOCRACY 58–59 (2002) (describing how the value system of an organization is formed
to handle issues faced by the organization).
261. Martha S. Feldman & James G. March, Information in Organizations as Signal and
Symbol, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 171, 181 (1981).
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Through these mechanisms, “staff become involved in advocacy for
their functions that can alter power relations within organizations
262
over the long run.”
An organization can be shaped in significant ways by empowered
internal constituencies that are committed to a particular set of
values. For instance, a number of studies have found that compliance
professionals are crucial to improving corporate compliance with
263
regulatory goals.
The improvement happens as compliance
professionals embed issues of compliance into the routine
264
decisionmaking processes of corporate managers and employees. Of
course, the mere existence of compliance personnel, or internal
constituencies committed to a defined set of values, hardly ensures
the realization of a normative vision that might otherwise stand in
tension with other organizational goals, such as profit maximization
or political obedience. Rather, to embed their values in the
decisionmaking process, internal norm generators must have
265
266
“autonomy and influence” or “clout” within the organization.
They must, in other words, be “seen as adding value to the
[organization] as knowledgeable, reasonable, and politically
267
important insiders.”
A second structural mechanism channeling organizational
behavior is the set of routines or standard practices that organizations
268
establish to guide the actions of their members. Routines embody

262. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150
(1983).
263. E.g., PARKER, supra note 260, at 23–25; see also FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE
REGULATION: BEYOND ‘PUNISH OR PERSUADE’ 165–66 (1997) (describing how internal
compliance helps to decrease workplace-related fatalities); JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE
WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 85–174 (1988)
(describing corporate responses to the creation of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration); Valerie Braithwaite, The Australian Government’s Affirmative Action
Legislation: Achieving Social Change Through Human Resource Management, 15 LAW & POL.
327, 341–52 (1993) (looking at corporate compliance with Australia’s affirmative-action
legislation).
264. PARKER, supra note 260, at 125.
265. TAYLOR, supra note 259, at 256 (emphasis omitted).
266. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 359
(1984).
267. DAVID P. MCCAFFREY & DAVID W. HART, WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF: HOW
SECURITIES FIRMS MANAGE THE LEGAL HAZARDS OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURES 176 (1998).
268. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 21 (1989); SIMON, supra note 255, at 102; Martha S.
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the collective experience of the organization in addressing particular
269
kinds of problems. They facilitate the coordination of different
270
strands of activity within the organization and mitigate conflicts.
They promote efficient organizational operation by relieving
individual members of the burden of determining anew each time a
271
task arises how it should be done. More importantly, scholars have
272
found that organizational routines exert “strong inertial pressures”
because they are “independent of the individual actors who execute
them and are capable of surviving considerable turnover in
273
individuals.”
Thus, although individuals within organizations
invariably have a certain amount of discretion, that discretion is
channeled by “the allocation of attention, standards of evaluation,
priorities, perceptions, and resources” sedimented in the
274
organization’s routines.
Third, organizations shape the actions of their members through
what Professor Herbert Simon describes as “systems of authority and
275
influence.” Hierarchical authority structures may be important in
shaping the attention and priorities of an organization’s members, but
they are not the only forms of authority operating in organizations.
Equally important are the informal systems of power and influence
that develop in organizations based on the status of individual
276
members and their relationships with one another. In bureaucratic
organizations of all types, status and influence flow from individual

Feldman & Barry T. Pentland, Reconceptualizing Organizational Routines as a Source of
Flexibility and Change, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 94, 94 (2003).
269. See MARCH & OLSEN, supra note 268, at 24 (“Routines embody collective and
individual identities, interests, values, and worldviews, thus constraining the allocation of
attention, standards of evaluation, priorities, perceptions, and resources.” (citations omitted)).
270. Id.
271. SIMON, supra note 255, at 102; see also RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 119 (1992) (“Standard operating procedures are the
memory of the organization.”).
272. Heather A. Haveman, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Organizational Change and
Performance Under Conditions of Fundamental Environmental Transformation, 37 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 48, 49 (1992).
273. MARCH & OLSEN, supra note 268, at 22.
274. Id. at 24.
275. SIMON, supra note 255, at 103.
276. Id.
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members’ professional prestige, their possession of information,
or their role as conduits for important information possessed by
279
others. A common misconception, identified by Professors Richard
Cyert and James March, is that “organizations are hierarchies in
which higher levels control lower levels, and policies control
280
implementation.”
As Professors Cyert and March observe,
“Portrayals built on such conceptions of order seem, however, to
underestimate the confusion and complexity surrounding actual
281
decision making.”
Such portrayals also tend to overestimate
managers’ ability to impose order through hierarchical commands—a
point captured by Professor W. Richard Scott’s comment that “[n]o
planners are so farseeing or omniscient as to be able to anticipate all
the possible contingencies that might confront each position in the
282
organization.” Instead, informal authority structures “play a larger
role in producing dependable behavior than do commands or
283
sanctions” and allow the organization to “impos[e] elements of
284
order on a potentially inchoate world.”
Finally, the decisions of individuals operating within
organizations are shaped by the training that those individuals receive
about their organization’s procedures, its core goals and values, and
their superiors’ expectations. Organizations socialize and educate
their members to internalize norms about appropriate and
inappropriate behavior, and this sense of what constitutes appropriate
action in the organizational context becomes essential to defining and
285
maintaining individuals’ organizational identities. As Professor
277. See, e.g., Carol A. Heimer, Explaining Variation in the Impact of Law: Organizations,
Institutions, and Professions, in 15 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 29, 45 (Austin
Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1995) (comparing the privileges among members of a healthcare
team and observing that physicians have more control over decisionmaking than nurses or social
workers).
278. See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 993–98 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ.
of Cal. Press 1978) (1922) (emphasizing the importance of specialized knowledge in
bureaucracies).
279. W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 75
(1981).
280. CYERT & MARCH, supra note 271, at 232.
281. Id.
282. SCOTT, supra note 279, at 84.
283. Id. at 75.
284. March & Olsen, supra note 256, at 743.
285. James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political
Orders, 52 INT’L ORG. 943, 948 (1998).
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Simon notes, “The organization member acquires knowledge, skill,
and identifications or loyalties that enable him to make decisions, by
286
himself, as the organization would like him to decide.”
Organizations function more efficiently and predictably when their
members anticipate institutional expectations rather than acquiescing
287
to specific commands from superiors.
These four structural features of organizations, individually and
in combination with one another, “account for much of the regularity
288
and patterning that exist” in organizations, but their influence goes
beyond merely shaping behavior. They generate normative and
cognitive structures that are absorbed by the individual members of
organizations, guiding not only their behavior but also their
understanding of what is right and appropriate to do in a given
situation. As stated by Professor March and his colleague Professor
Johan Olsen, “Organizational action requires a model of the
289
world,” and organizational structures provide such a model. The
rituals, roles, and routines embedded in organizational structures
serve a “sense-making” function, helping individuals understand
complex environments and conveying norms and values about what is
290
right and appropriate in a given situation.
In this way,
organizational structures define individuals’ perception of
appropriate alternatives, likely consequences, and the normative
291
desirability of their actions. Professors Dennis Gioia and Peter
Poole summarize this point: “People in organizations know how to
act appropriately because they have a working knowledge of their
organizational world. They enact the ‘right’ behaviors most of the
time in part because they retain a cognitive repertoire of scripts fitting

286. SIMON, supra note 255, at 103.
287. See id. at 129 (explaining that when a subordinate anticipates commands, “authority
will need to be exercised only to reverse an incorrect decision”).
288. SCOTT, supra note 279, at 14.
289. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, AMBIGUITY AND CHOICE IN ORGANIZATIONS
19 (1976).
290. See Harrison M. Trice & Janice M. Beyer, Studying Organizational Cultures Through
Rites and Ceremonials, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 653, 654 (1984) (“[C]ultural
messages . . . express . . . norms and values that proclaim to system members the rightness of
certain beliefs and practices over others.”).
291. See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Institutional Perspectives on Political
Institutions, 9 GOVERNANCE 247, 250 (1996) (“Rational action depends on subjective
perceptions of alternatives, their consequences, and their evaluations. . . . [I]nstitutional
conceptions see such calculations and anticipations as occurring within a broader framework of
rules, roles, and identities.” (citations omitted)).
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a host of organizational settings.” Thus, when an organization acts,
its action is often motivated less by a calculation about the desirability
of a particular outcome than by the reality that “it would be
293
unthinkable to do otherwise.”
2. Deference Doctrine and the Organizational Structure of
Agencies. Placing the onus on agencies to articulate rational reasons
for their actions, as the traditional deference regime does, fosters
these kinds of internal disciplinary structures in administrative
organizations. Hard-look review has encouraged agencies to develop
internal constituencies of professionals who are committed to
scientific, analytical, and reasoned decisionmaking; and even more
importantly, it has given those constituencies some measure of
policymaking clout within agency organizations. Agencies often face
tremendous political pressure to adopt a particular policy position.
The fact that they must ultimately justify their decisions on rational
grounds gives these professionals a voice in the organization that they
might not otherwise have. Hard-look review, among other factors, has
also prompted agencies to develop routines that force consideration
of the opinions and evidence provided by the agency’s expert
294
constituencies.
These routines, in turn, have given these
constituencies informal authority within the agency organizations that
rely on them for information. Taken together, these effects have
produced an agency culture that focuses agencies’ attention on

292. Dennis A. Gioia & Peter P. Poole, Scripts in Organizational Behavior, 9 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 449, 450 (1984).
293. Christine Oliver, Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
145, 149 (1991).
294. What I characterize here as “routines,” in the parlance of organizational theory, legal
scholarship characterizes as “additional procedures, analytical requirements, and external
review mechanisms.” See, e.g., McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 37, at 1386. For instance,
Professor McGarity argues that agencies subject to hard-look review perceived the need to draft
much lengthier and much more technical justifications for their rules than they had done under
less stringent deference regimes. Id. at 1387. Professor McGarity reports:
The “concise general statement of basis and purpose” for the original primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards promulgated under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970 consisted of a single page in the Federal Register when they
were promulgated in 1971. The preamble to the 1987 revision of a single primary
standard consumed 36 pages in the Federal Register and was supported by a 100-pluspage staff paper, a lengthy Regulatory Impact Analysis that cost the agency millions
of dollars, and a multi-volume criteria document.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Agencies have relied on expert professional constituencies to provide
the substantive content for the additional layers of analysis perceived as necessary to survive
hard-look review. Id. at 1398.
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policies that will be publicly justifiable based both on the available
295
evidence and on the grounds for past decisions.
Although models of political reason giving purport to preserve
rational grounds for justification as a doctrinal matter, allowing
enhanced deference for “legitimate” political reasons would
undermine the constituencies within agency organizations that are
committed to developing nonpolitical reasons for agency actions in
two important ways and would thereby weaken the foundations of
internal disciplinary structures. First, political appointees who can
justify their decisions on judicial review based, in part, on political
motivations will have less need to rely on professional staff to support
agency actions. This decreased reliance would significantly diminish
the power and informal authority of professional constituencies
within agency organizations, along with the values those
constituencies embody and the structural processes and routines they
tend to support.
Second, and perhaps even more debilitating in the long run,
political reason giving would undermine the motivation of the
professional members of these constituencies and would lead to their
exodus from agency organizations. As Professor Scott points out, “Of
all the many resources required by organizations, the most vital are
296
the contributions of [their] human participants.” These participants
have many choices regarding how to spend their time and thus must
be motivated to contribute to the organization’s goals. In public
service, an arena in which material rewards often do not fully
compensate individuals for the effort they expend, many agency
professionals are motivated by the meaning that they derive from
297
contributing to the realization of the organization’s goals, especially
when those goals reinforce their professional identity or personal
298
values. Privileging political reasons for agency action could degrade
295. See Schauer, supra note 46, at 657 (arguing that the reason-giving model creates
consistency and justifiability because “in the future [decisionmakers will] treat their prior
statements as constraining” and because the strategy reduces “bias, self-interest, insufficient
reflection, or simply excess haste”).
296. SCOTT, supra note 279, at 158.
297. See id. at 160 (“[M]embers join [a purposive organization] because they wish to help in
achieving the goals espoused by the organization; and the organization, in achieving its goals,
supplies inducements to its members securing their continuing contributions.”).
298. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW
OUR IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 42 (2010) (arguing that pay
incentives are less important for a person who “thinks she should work on behalf of the firm”
because “[h]er ideal is to exert high effort”); DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER:
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this crucial source of meaning for expert and professional staff,
causing demoralization and attrition. For example, dedicated medical
researchers would not be highly motivated to work for the FDA if
they knew that a court would uphold the agency’s approval or
disapproval of drugs based on the administration’s “value preferences
299
or policy calls.”
Of course, it is possible that this kind of deprofessionalization of
agencies is exactly what political reason giving aims to achieve. There
are certainly drawbacks to the professional cultures and practices that
structure agencies under hard-look review, including the kinds of
300
delay and technical opacity often characterized as “ossification.”
The desire to eliminate ossification may translate operationally into a
desire to undo the layers of professional staffing and the culture of
justification that surrounds rulemaking. But this enterprise seems a
dangerous gamble in the absence of any consideration of what might
replace existing organizational structures and what agencies might
come to look like under a political reason-giving regime.
Whatever organizational structures political reason giving might
produce, hierarchical political control cannot replicate two key
functions served by the structures created and supported by hardlook review. First, organizational structures constrain and regularize
agency decisions in the absence of direct oversight by either the
political branches or the judiciary. This kind of intrinsic discipline is
ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 48 (2010)
(“The identity and esteem of an individual often depend upon wider social evaluations of the
organization to which she belongs.”); SCOTT, supra note 279, at 160 (suggesting that
organizations must “sustain the interests of members”).
299. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 1171. Professor Watts suggests that her proposal is aimed
at preserving a space for science by segregating politics into its own distinct sphere. Watts, supra
note 4, at 40–41. I disagree not only with the fundamental premise that the two can be separated
but also with the suggestion that giving greater credence to politics will have the effect of
empowering science. The premise that the two can be separated relies on untenable notions of
pure scientific objectivity. If scientific objectivity cannot be achieved, the primary goal would
have to be more modest, such as preserving some amount of autonomy for the development of
scientific knowledge. But power is crucial to maintaining autonomy. Hard-look review confers
power on scientific constituencies; political reason giving diminishes their sphere of power. This
calculus underlies my claims in this Section.
300. For a description of the problem of “ossification,” see, for example, William S. Jordan,
III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with
Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 393, 394 (2000); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an
Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1285 (1989); Pierce, Seven Ways, supra
note 37, at 61; and Paul R. Verkuil, Comment, Rulemaking Ossification—A Modest Proposal, 47
ADMIN. L. REV. 453, 453 (1995).
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of critical importance because the bulk of agency activity takes place
outside the glare of political or judicial spotlights. Whereas academic
literature understandably focuses on the narrow band of significant,
high-profile agency policymaking exercises, the mine run of agency
activity—issuing licenses, making grants, targeting enforcement, and
formulating more mundane policy—will never cross the president’s
desk or a judge’s bench. The discipline constraining these pervasive
activities comes largely from the social and organizational structures
that shape the way agency staff do their jobs.
Second, these organizational structures give agencies, and expert
constituencies within agencies, a means of pushing back against
inappropriate exercises of executive power. Although Professors
Watts and Mendelson concede that the president cannot direct policy
that contradicts statutory mandates or the agency’s factual findings,
such safeguards are utterly hollow in the absence of internal
constituencies that are committed to the values of statutory fidelity
and scientific integrity and who are empowered to press their cases up
the ranks of the agency.
B. Reason Giving Structures the Interactions Among Legal and
Political Institutions
In social theory, reason giving is a practice associated with
negotiating social relationships and facilitating cooperation and
301
collective action. Further, it is a way of validating the hierarchies
that result from social interaction and of justifying the outcomes of
these interactions in widely acceptable terms. As sociologist Charles
Tilly explains, “Whatever else they are doing when they give reasons,
people are clearly negotiating their social lives. They are saying
something about relations between themselves and those who hear
302
their reasons.” This insight can be applied to legal institutions

301. See, e.g., BOLTANSKI & THÉVENOT, supra note 253, at 37 (“[W]e propose to take
seriously the imperative to justify that underlies the possibility of coordinating human
behavior . . . .”); ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 162–63 (1971) (“The position is
being taken, then, that the individual constantly acts to provide information that he is of sound
character and reasonable competency.”); CHARLES TILLY, WHY? 30 (2006) (“Most of us feel
more comfortable challenging the reasons given by taxi drivers than those proposed by
physicians. But in either case we are, among other things, negotiating definitions of the relations
between us.”); C. Wright Mills, Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive, 5 AM. SOC. REV.
904, 907 (1940) (“[A]cts often will be abandoned if no reason can be found that others will
accept. Diplomacy in choice of motive often controls the diplomat.”).
302. TILLY, supra note 301, at 15.
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balancing their relationships with one another in a government of
divided powers. The problem with political reason giving is that it
would circumscribe the terms of this negotiation and establish a fixed
hierarchy among institutions through the back door of deference
doctrine.
303

1. The Sociology of Reason Giving. In his book Why?,
Professor Tilly articulates a matrix of different modes of reason giving
and argues that the types of reasons that are given—and accepted—
reveal significant information about the status positions or social roles
304
within a given relationship. In Tilly’s typology, reason types are
situated along two axes, as demonstrated in Table 1: one axis that
runs from formulaic reasons to reasons that attempt to explain causeeffect relationships, and another that runs from popular to specialized
305
discourses. The key distinction for purposes of understanding the
effect of political reason giving is between formulaic reasons and
cause-effect accounts. Formulaic reasons “identify an appropriate
correspondence” between the event, action or outcome to be
explained and some antecedent event or action, but they make little
306
attempt to articulate the causal chain connecting the two. By
contrast, cause-effect accounts “trace causal lines” between
307
antecedent actions and subsequent actions or outcomes. In the
following discussion, I describe the different types of reasons that
Tilly’s matrix generates and I illustrate what a reason in each category
might look like by reference to a hypothetical example of a social
situation in which reason giving is demanded: imagine that a partner
at a large law firm asks an associate why she works so hard.

303. TILLY, supra note 301.
304. Id. at 15. These are, of course, ideal types, and many reasons may fall somewhere in
between these stylized categories.
305. Id. at 19.
306. Id. at 20.
307. Id.

SHORT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/12/2012 1:56 AM

POWER, RATIONALITY, AND REASONS

1873

Table 1. Reason-Giving Typology
Popular

Formulas

Cause-Effect
Accounts

Conventions: Generally accepted
reasons for events that require
explanation
Stories: Explanatory narratives
incorporating cause-effect accounts
of unfamiliar phenomena or
exceptional events

Specialized
Codes: Rule-based explanations of
actions based on authoritative
source such as a legal or religious
prescription
Technical Accounts: Reasons that
claim to identify reliable relations of
cause and effect based on expert
knowledge

As illustrated by Table 1, formulaic reasons come in two flavors:
308
309
conventions, which are popular, and codes, which are specialized.
Conventions are the generally accepted colloquialisms of social
interaction: “Why did you get the job?” “Just lucky, I guess.” “How
could you forget our coffee date?” “My head’s just not on straight
these days.” “How did you twist your ankle?” “I’m such a klutz.”
310
Conventions make no claim to causal adequacy. They are the
reasons that individuals give because it would be too exhausting, if
not cognitively prohibitive, to articulate the cause-and-effect
relationships of every action or situation in which reasons are
311
demanded. So, for instance, if the hypothetical associate were to
explain her diligence with a convention, she might say something like,
“Idle hands are the devil’s playground.”
Codes likewise “involve no pretense of providing adequate
312
causal accounts,” but they rely for their force on the authority of
313
Codes typically take the form of
expertise or specialization.
314
categories, procedures, and rules. Reasons in the form of codes
purport to justify actions or explain situations by citation to these
sources of authority. Professor Tilly explains that, in contrast to

308. Popular reasons are those grounded in “practical knowledge not only from individual
experience but also from the social settings in which we live.” Id. at 21. They are context specific
and “vary from one social setting to another.” Id.
309. Specialized reasons “rely[] on extensive training” in a particular discourse or discipline.
Id. at 19.
310. Id. at 40.
311. Id. at 15–16.
312. Id. at 15.
313. Id. at 125 (“Codes emerge from the incremental efforts of organizations to impose
order on the ideas, resources, activities, and people that fall under their control.” (citation
omitted)).
314. Id. at 102.
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cause-effect accounts, “codes need not bear much explanatory weight
315
so long as they conform to the available rules.” Turning back to the
hypothetical associate, she could answer her partner by citation to a
code: “The employee compensation manual requires that associates
bill 2,200 hours per year in order to be eligible for promotion.”
Cause-effect accounts similarly come in two flavors: stories,
which are popular, and technical accounts, which are specialized.
Stories draw on common knowledge and everyday experience to
weave a narrative that attempts to causally explain actions, events, or
316
outcomes. The fact that the receivers of stories may “find those
causal lines absurd or incomprehensible” is irrelevant to their
317
categorization. It is the attempt to articulate a causal chain that
318
counts rather than that chain’s credibility. If the hypothetical
associate were to answer with a story, it might look something like the
following: “My parents immigrated to this country and worked hard
to make a living to provide for our family. I work hard because that’s
what they taught me to do and because I want to honor their
sacrifice.”
Finally, technical accounts in Professor Tilly’s scheme are
specialized reasons that “claim to identify reliable connections of
cause and effect” based on the formal training and accumulated
319
expertise of the reason giver. Thus, they often depend on the reason
giver’s disciplinary background, and they can be technical or opaque
320
to inexpert receivers. For instance, if the overworked associate had
been trained as a sociologist, her technical account might go
something like this: “I am working to overcome the structural
disadvantage I suffer in the workplace because of my gender.” Or if
she had been trained as a psychologist, she might say, “Working hard

315. Id. at 17. Professionals often derive codes by synthesizing and abridging the ordinary
stories people tell. So, for example, medical professionals who hear countless stories about
illnesses and ailments distill those stories into categories that provisionally suggest diagnoses or
treatment. Cf. id. at 103 (“Within any . . . arena [of professional expertise], authorities
commonly change the rules as they encounter some new problem; accumulated rules therefore
provide a map of significant earlier problems people have faced in their arena.”).
316. See id. at 15 (“Stories: explanatory narratives incorporating cause-effect accounts of
unfamiliar phenomena or of exceptional events . . . .”).
317. Id. at 20.
318. Id. at 20–21.
319. Id. at 18.
320. See id. at 171–73 (illustrating the specialization of technical accounts with an example
of students in different fields).
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and getting ahead reinforces my identity as a feminist committed to
workplace equality.”
The significance of these categories lies in what the different
kinds of reasons reveal about the social relationships in which they
are proffered and either accepted or rejected. For instance, formulaic
reasons are more likely to suffice if the reason giver occupies a
superior social rank to the reason receiver. In the words of Professor
Tilly, “Givers who offer formulas thereby claim superiority and/or
321
distance” from receivers. Were the overworked associate to turn the
tables and ask the partner why she works so hard, it would be entirely
within the conventional social boundaries of this relationship for the
superior to quip, “Idle hands are the devil’s playground!” But reason
receivers do not always accept formulaic accounts. When a reason
receiver rejects a proffered formulaic response and demands a causeeffect account, this demand implicitly challenges the reason giver’s
322
assumption of superiority. Even when the reason giver clearly has
superior status or authority, the reason receiver can prompt causeeffect accounts if she has some means of what Professor Tilly
describes as “visible power to affect [the] giver’s subsequent
323
welfare.”
Typically, the type of reasons given corresponds with the giver’s
324
presumed relationship with the receiver. But reasons do not always
match the apparent nature of the relationship, and in such situations,
the reasons proffered may represent a proposed redefinition of the
325
relationship and the status positions within it. So, for instance, one
would not expect the law firm associate to respond to a query about
her work habits from her managing partner by quipping, “Idle hands
are the devil’s playground.” If she did so, one might surmise that she
was signaling a shift in the power dynamics of the relationship:
perhaps she was planning to leave the firm and no longer cared how
she was perceived. It is in this way that reason giving defines the
boundaries of relationships and either acknowledges or negotiates the
status of the parties within them.

321. Id. at 174 (emphasis omitted).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 175 (emphasis omitted).
324. Id. at 173.
325. See id. (“[T]he giving of reasons creates, confirms, negotiates, or repairs relations
between the parties.”).
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2. Reason Giving and Interbranch Status Hierarchy. Viewed
through this sociological lens, the debate about political reason giving
is a debate about the status relationships of different legal
institutions. Political reasons take the form of codes, or citations to
authority: if an agency is acting both within its statutory authority and
326
in accord with legitimate presidential authority, it should be upheld.
In this view, courts lack the status to ask the executive to give a causal
account of its actions. One view of Fox would be that Justice Scalia
merely acknowledged the agency’s statutory and executive authority
to enact a policy that the administration believed was better than the
old, and that this information is all a court needs to know.
Hard-look review can be thought of as a demand by courts that
agencies go beyond mere codes to provide reasons that will specify
the cause-effect relationships that produced the outcome at issue.
This characterization is precisely why hard-look review has been so
controversial. It is, at base, the courts resisting executive claims to a
fixed, superior status. Hard-look review allows courts to evaluate the
adequacy of the executive’s cause-effect explanations.
Many commentators have taken hard-look review to be a
demand by courts for technical accounts, requiring an agency to
marshal expertise to craft a causal explanation about why its policy is
327
justified. In fact, this conception is what appears to be motivating
328
Professor Watts’s critique of hard-look review. Consider, however,
that courts have applied this standard of review in a way that also
encompasses less technical and more popular cause-effect narratives.
In fact, in Fox, the Court did not merely defer to the FCC’s authority,
but rather examined the substance of the reasons given by the agency
for its decision. The central reasons for the FCC’s change to the
fleeting-expletives policy could have been characterized as stories in

326. As discussed in Part II.B, political reason-giving models would not permit agencies to
claim deference merely because “the president made them do it.” They would, however, permit
agencies to claim deference for actions ordered by the president based on the legitimate reasons
articulated by the president. That agencies would cite to reasons articulated by an authority
figure rather than to the bald authority of that figure does not change the reasons’ status as
codes, or citations to authority, in the way that term is used in Professor Tilly’s matrix.
327. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 37, at 62–63 (describing the virtues of apolitical expertise
in the administrative process); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 108–09 (arguing that courts play an “expertiseforcing” role when agencies fail to provide a technical justification for their decisions).
328. See Watts, supra note 4, at 12 (discussing how the “current demand for
technical . . . explanations” is a development exemplifying why the role of politics needs to be
better understood).

SHORT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

POWER, RATIONALITY, AND REASONS

4/12/2012 1:56 AM

1877

Professor Tilly’s terms. The FCC argued that if it were to exempt
fleeting expletives categorically from enforcement, the exemption
would encourage more widespread use of single, offensive words, a
result that would be harmful to the nation’s children and that might
encourage children to use more profane language themselves—a
consequence that would, presumably, be harmful to the rest of
329
society. There was no evidence for this proposition. The FCC’s
argument was a narrative that purported to establish causal
relationships by drawing on popular understandings and experiences.
Perhaps the correct reading of Fox, then, is that courts have the status
to demand cause-effect accounts of agency actions on judicial review
but that these reasons need not be invariably technical. In some
330
circumstances, more popular narratives will suffice.
An understanding of rational justification that encompasses
more popular cause-effect accounts would satisfy many of the
concerns that political reason-giving models seek to address, but it
would do so from within the existing doctrinal framework for
arbitrary-and-capricious review and would arguably do so better than
mere citation to legitimate political authority. First, stories make
transparent the values underlying an administrative decision. There is
no mistaking what values underlie the FCC’s new fleeting-expletives
policy. Second, they do so in widely understandable terms. Although
stories can be criticized because they “enormously simplify the
331
processes involved” in the relationships they describe, this kind of
simplification can serve important purposes: as Professor Tilly
explains, because stories rely “on widely available knowledge rather
332
than technical expertise, they help make the world intelligible.” This
kind of broad intelligibility is essential to the political accountability
of administration that models of political reason giving seek. In
articulating stories in support of its decision, the FCC was making the
329. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1808–09 (2009).
330. Of course, under the prevailing standard for arbitrary-and-capricious review, Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983),
courts presented with stories must determine whether those stories provide a “rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made,” id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This inquiry
does not require that the stories themselves be rational, but rather that it was rational for the
agency to have based its decision on the cause-effect account it provided—in other words, that
the agency’s account explains in a rational way the path from what the agency knew to what the
agency did.
331. TILLY, supra note 301, at 65.
332. Id. at 64.
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provocative suggestion that the primary audience for administrative
reasons, at least in certain circumstances, might be the public rather
than judges accustomed to receiving and reviewing technical accounts.
At the same time, requiring agencies to provide cause-effect accounts
of their actions instead of formulaic reasons preserves for courts the
power and status necessary to police these actions meaningfully.
This social account of reason giving has significant affinities with
functional approaches to separation of powers that focus on the
333
“relationships and interconnections” between and among the three
constitutional branches and administrative agencies. The functionalist
approach seeks to balance and restrain the exercise of government
power not through formal limitations, but rather through what
Professor Cynthia Farina describes as “the carefully orchestrated
334
disposition and sharing of authority.” Professor Emily Meazell
demonstrates how this balance gets calibrated, in part, through
335
ongoing dialogues between courts and agencies. Rational reason
giving, or reason giving that demands cause-effect accounts, facilitates
this kind of dialogue, sharing, and balancing of power among the
branches in their day-to-day interactions. By contrast, an approach to
reason giving that privileges political reasons, or mere citations to
legitimate presidential authority, would arguably fix the roles of these
institutions and would circumscribe their ability to calibrate and
recalibrate their relationships as circumstances might demand. It
would, in other words, formalize a particular vision of the status
hierarchy among the various branches, placing the executive squarely
at the top in all matters over which agencies have discretion to act.
Whatever the merits of a more formal approach to separation of
powers, this contested vision of the constitutional constraints on
administration should be discussed more thoroughly and explicitly
before being imposed de facto through deference doctrine.

333. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984).
334. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 496 (1989); see also John F. Manning, Separation
of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1952 n.52 (2011) (referring to
this proposition as a “functionalist premise”).
335. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 1722, 1730–43 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
Models of political reason giving present a welcome challenge to
prevailing views about reason and politics in administrative
justification, but they ultimately fail on their own terms, and they fail
to meet the challenge of transforming fundamental understandings
about the role that reasons play in administration. Arbitrary-andcapricious review is a doctrinal mechanism for enforcing constraints
on agency discretion, but rules alone do not constrain. Hard-look
review has fostered social and organizational mechanisms that
empower and constrain agencies, both in concert with political
control and in the vast array of cases in which such top-down
guidance is entirely absent. This doctrinal framework should not be
discarded until a fuller account is made of what would take its place.
This plea goes beyond the debate about political reason giving.
Administrative law is ultimately enacted through the filter of the
organizational structures that constitute agencies and the social and
institutional relationships in which those structures are embedded. It
is crucial to understand how different rules might create and shape
the mechanisms that so deeply influence what agencies do. Legal
scholarship has begun to recognize the potential power of internal
organizational constraints on government institutions. The literature
on internal separation-of-powers measures, for instance, has
suggested that even in the absence of meaningful judicial or
congressional checks, the power of the executive can be constrained,
at least to a certain extent, by structuring executive institutions to
336
ensure politically responsive decisionmaking. My argument here is
not that the internal organizational structures of agencies are a
substitute or a backstop for legal or political constraints on agency
action, but rather that they are the mechanism by which these larger
constraints get enacted. As Professor Gillian Metzger observes in the

336. See, e.g., WALTER E. DELLINGER, DAWN JOHNSEN, RANDOLPH MOSS, CHRISTOPHER
SCHROEDER, JOSEPH R. GUERRA, BETH NOLAN, TODD PETERSON, CORNELIA T.L. PILLARD,
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TERESA WYNN ROSEBOROUGH, RICHARD SHIFFRIN, WILLIAM
MICHAEL TREANOR, DAVID BARRON, STUART BENJAMIN, LISA BROWN, PAMELA HARRIS,
NEIL KINKOPF, MARTIN LEDERMAN & MICHAEL SMALL, PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE
OF LEGAL COUNSEL 4 (2004), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/2004%20programs_
OLC%20principles_white%20paper.pdf; Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319 (2006)
(“[T]he collapse of external checks and balances . . . demonstrate[s] the need for internal
ones.”); Metzger, supra note 19, at 425 (valuing accountability as a check on the executive but
still highly valuing the use of external checks from other branches).
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separation-of-powers context, it is important to design doctrinal
frameworks in a way that recognizes how “[i]nternal and external
337
checks reinforce and operate in conjunction with one another.”
Proposals for administrative-law reform should likewise consider how
they would impact internal checks on agencies.
This Article’s theoretical approach to administrative reason
giving and administrative-law reform has three important benefits.
First, it highlights the real dangers of a move toward more politicized
reason giving. Through this lens, the problem with political reasons is
not that they are irrational; it is that they are likely to erode the very
social and organizational structures that actually constrain—and
enable—agencies in their day-to-day activities without theorizing
what would take their place.
Second, a conception of agency constraints as fundamentally
social and organizational demonstrates why deference doctrine still
matters and why judges, lawyers, and scholars should care about
getting it right. Professor David Zaring’s finding that courts remand
agency actions at roughly the same rate under each level of
338
deference has prompted some soul searching—or at least footnote
dropping—among administrative-law scholars concerned that the
finding might reduce the importance of which deference standard
prevails—and thus their scholarly advocacy of one standard versus
339
another. A focus on the social and organizational manifestation of
different doctrinal frameworks helps to move the discussion beyond
this rather debilitating insight. The choice of a doctrinal framework
may or may not matter to the outcome of litigation once an agency
finds itself in court, but it can matter a great deal for the way agencies
structure their day-to-day activities. Administrative-law scholarship
should be thinking less about the formal coherence of doctrine and
more about what kinds of agencies different doctrinal frameworks
might create.
Third and finally, this Article’s approach provides a richer and
more complex way of thinking about the relationship between reason
and politics in administration, pushing beyond the view that one or

337. Metzger, supra note 19, at 444.
338. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 137 (2010).
339. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 18, at 1034–35 (suggesting other interpretations of
Professor Zaring’s statistical analysis); Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change,
and Fox Television, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 555, 574 (2011) (responding to Professor Zaring by
distinguishing between the breadth and depth of judicial review).
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the other dominates administrative decisionmaking and preserving a
space for multiple and conflicting narratives about regulation. In the
wake of the late twentieth-century regulatory reform movement,
aspirational New Deal narratives that saw regulation as the
application of expert knowledge to pressing modern problems in
service of the public interest have gradually been displaced by
economic narratives about regulation as inefficient, beholden to
narrow private interests, and, in some sense, impossible, given
340
humans’ limited cognitive capabilities. Highlighting political reasons
for agency actions is likely to erode further the aspirational narratives
about what regulation is and what it might be. Aspirational narratives
are inherently fragile because regulation always and inevitably falls
short of them. But it is important to ensure that they remain a part of
the dialogue about regulation because losing sight of them would
deprive the regulatory state of its normative foundation.

340. See Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633
(2012) (describing the evolution of economic critiques of regulation over the course of the
twentieth century).

